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THE  BIG  DATA  JURY
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson*
ABSTRACT
Big data technologies now exist to create algorithmically perfect jury pools matching the
demographic realities of a community.  Big data technologies also exist to provide litigants a
wealth of personal information about potential jurors.  The question remains whether these tech-
nological innovations benefit the jury system.  This Article addresses the disruptive impact of big
data on jury selection and the dilemma it presents to courts, lawyers, and citizens.
INTRODUCTION
Jury selection requires personal information about citizens.  Courts need
to know whom to summon.  Litigants need to know whom to select.  Personal
identifying data is central to providing a representative and fair jury.  Yet,
courts and litigants know very little about individuals called to serve on juries.
This institutional ignorance is purposeful, puzzling, and soon to be chal-
lenged by ever-expanding “big data” technologies which are currently collect-
ing billions of bits of personal data on American citizens.1
© 2015 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, David A. Clarke School of Law at the University of the District of
Columbia.  Thank you to Professors Lea Johnston, Cara Drinan, Kevin Lapp, Nina
Chernoff, Cortney Lollar, Vida Johnson, and Samantha Buckingham for their review of
earlier drafts of this Article.  Special thank you to Adrian Madsen for his excellent research
assistance.
1 Steve Lohr, How Big Data Became So Big, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www
.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/business/how-big-data-became-so-big-unboxed.html (“Big Data
is a shorthand label that typically means applying the tools of artificial intelligence, like
machine learning, to vast new troves of data beyond that captured in standard databases.”);
see JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., BIG DATA: THE NEXT FRONTIER FOR INNO-
VATION, COMPETITION, AND PRODUCTIVITY 1 (2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/
business_technology/big_data_the_next_frontier_for_innovation (“‘Big data’ refers to
datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture, store,
manage, and analyze.  This definition is intentionally subjective and incorporates a moving
definition of how big a dataset needs to be in order to be considered big data—i.e., we
don’t define big data in terms of being larger than a certain number of terabytes
(thousands of gigabytes).  We assume that, as technology advances over time, the size of
datasets that qualify as big data will also increase.”).
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This Article addresses the dilemma that big data poses to jury selection.
The Article examines the law, practice, and theoretical questions that arise
when courts and litigants apply new technologies of data collection to jury
selection.  Evolving big data information systems have the potential to create
perfectly representative jury venires and even generate personalized dossiers
on individual jurors.  Yet, such informational precision presents real chal-
lenges to the existing jury system, offering promises of efficiency and accu-
racy at the expense of privacy and legitimacy.
The basic problem is one of information.  Today, court systems inter-
ested in summoning a “fair-cross-section”2 of citizens know only basic identi-
fying data about citizens—gender, race, age, employment, and limited
geographic characteristics.3  Jurors, as citizens, are considered equal, so long
as they meet the statutory requirements of service.4  In an effort to avoid
historically rooted discriminatory practices, courts have limited the data col-
lected about jurors and randomized the selection process.5  This egalitarian
and purposely myopic selection process, while an improvement over past
exclusionary practices, has not solved the problem of unrepresentative
juries.6  Constitutional fair cross-section litigation regularly exposes unrepre-
sentative jury pools, and courts have responded with a confused and contra-
dictory body of case law about what constitutes an impartial jury venire.7
Litigants equally know very little about individual jurors, although in
contrast to the court, wish to know as much as possible to predict who might
be favorable to their claims.8  In high profile cases, lawyers hire jury consul-
tants to divine the inclinations and attitudes of potential jurors.9  In most
cases, however, lawyers rely on hunches, stereotypes, and sometimes imper-
missible judgments based on race, ethnicity, or gender to find perceived par-
tisans for their cause.10  New methods of online investigation, involving both
2 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979) (establishing the fair cross-section test).
3 See Gregory E. Mize & Paula Hannaford-Agor, Jury Trial Innovations Across America:
How We Are Teaching and Learning from Each Other, 1 J. CT. INNOVATION 189, 206–07 (2008)
(detailing the limited information provided to litigants about jurors).
4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
5 See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY 99–100 (1994); Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justice
and Juror, 20 GA. L. REV. 257, 266–67 (1986).
6 Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross-Section
Guarantee by Confusing It with Equal Protection, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 145–46 (2012).
7 Id. at 165–83.
8 Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Investigating Jurors in the Digital Age: One Click at a Time, 60 U.
KAN. L. REV. 611, 611 (2012) (“[A]ttorneys have long sought to learn as much as possible
about those deciding the fate of their clients.”).
9 See, e.g., Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the Trial
Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If Anything, to Do About It, 1999 WIS.
L. REV. 441, 442–43.
10 Valerie P. Hans & Alayna Jehle, Avoid Bald Men and People with Green Socks? Other
Ways to Improve the Voir Dire Process in Jury Selection, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1179, 1190 (2003)
(“One consequence of limited voir dire is that it encourages attorneys to rely on stereo-
types based on a juror’s demographic characteristics because that is often the primary
information that they have about each individual juror.”); Gregory E. Mize & Paula Hanna-
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“Googling” potential jurors and studying social media connections, have gen-
erated additional ways to reveal information about potential jurors.11  Such
information derives from sources external to the court system, requiring
additional financial expenditures, and is accessible only to those who can
afford it.12
The result: a jury selection system that is both limiting and unequal.
Courts, purposely limited to basic identifying data, randomly select jury pools
that do not reflect demographic realities in society.13  Litigants, practically
limited to basic identifying data, choose jurors informed by the rough prox-
ies of race, ethnicity, or gender, resulting in the discriminatory use of per-
emptory challenges.14  Only those litigants with the financial means to
investigate individual jurors can go beyond rough stereotypes to find out
detailed personal information about potential jurors for their case.15  Lim-
ited data collection thus impacts both selection of the jury venire and the
actual jury panel in negative ways.
The rise of “big data” has the potential to upend the current informa-
tional limitations of jury selection.16  Big data companies collect, and have
collected, public and quasi-public information about most Americans’ con-
sumer, criminal, financial, health, political, and reading interests.17  Google
knows you have the flu before the doctor does.18  Target knows you are preg-
ford-Agor, Building a Better Voir Dire Process, 47 JUDGES’ J. 4, 4 (2008) (“The parties and their
lawyers want to learn as much as possible about the attitudes and life experiences of each
venire member to know who they want to keep out of the jury box.  But at times, lawyers
obtain so little information that jury selection becomes a hunch game.”).
11 Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 611–12. R
12 Dru Stevenson, Jury Selection and the Coase Theorem, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1645, 1654 n.39
(2012) (“The price tag for a full-service jury consultant helping prioritize peremptory
strikes during voir dire, and coaching with persuasion techniques throughout the trial, can
be hundreds of thousands or millions of dollars; prices for simply conducting a mock jury
to vet issues or arguments can range from $2000 to $20,000.”).
13 Nancy J. King, Racial Jurymandering: Cancer or Cure? A Contemporary Review of Affirma-
tive Action in Jury Selection, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 707, 719 (1993) (“[I]n many communities
across the country, the percentage of minority veniremembers, trial and grand jurors, and
grand jury forepersons is significantly lower than the percentage of minority adults living
in the communities from which they are drawn.”).
14 See infra Section I.B.
15 See Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 611. R
16 See infra Part II.
17 FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABIL-
ITY, at i–ii (2014), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-
transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databroker-
report.pdf [hereinafter DATA BROKERS] (studying the data collection practices of nine com-
panies: Acxiom, Corelogic, Datalogix, eBureau, ID Analytics, Intelius, PeekYou, Rapleaf,
and Recorded Future).
18 DAVID BOLLIER, THE ASPEN INST., THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF BIG DATA 1–2 (2010)
(“Google now studies the timing and location of search-engine queries to predict flu out-
breaks and unemployment trends before official government statistics come out.  Credit
card companies routinely pore over vast quantities of census, financial and personal infor-
mation to try to detect fraud and identify consumer purchasing trends.”).
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nant before your friends do.19  Amazon will soon send you items that you
want before you actually order them.20  According to a Federal Trade Com-
mission Report, commercial data brokers possess as many as 3,000 data
points on every American consumer, segmented into household categories
such as “Affluent Baby Boomer,” “Bible Lifestyle,” “Leans Left,” or “African
American Professional.”21  If tasked to do so by court administrators, these
companies could produce a fair cross-section of individuals that not only
represent the racial and gender demographics of a jurisdiction, but also a fair
cross-section, as measured by class, age, geography, political affiliation, and
even consumer interests or hobbies.22
This Article examines the dilemma that “big data” presents to those
responsible for summoning and selecting jurors.  Commercial providers pos-
sess, and government databases contain, better, more targeted, but very per-
sonal data in easily accessible formats.23  I call this information, focused on
individuals or groups, “bright data”—“bright” because it is smart (precise and
targeted) and because it is illuminating (revealing preferences and patterns).
Courts could use this data to select the larger jury venire, and litigants could
use this data to select the particular jury panel.  For court administrators, the
availability of additional information provides the potential for increased jury
diversity, beyond the rough categories of race, gender, and geography.  For
litigants, the available information could provide a wealth of insights once
only available from expensive jury consultants.  Big data could democratize
19 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV.
2010, 2022 (2013) [hereinafter Strahilevitz, Privacy Law] (“Target famously used data min-
ing to observe that pregnant women were likely to buy calcium, magnesium, and zinc sup-
plements in their first trimester, unscented lotion early in their second trimester, and hand
sanitizer close to their due dates.”); Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was
Pregnant Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:02 AM), http:// www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-
father-did.
20 Lydia DePillis, Amazon Wants to Send Stuff Before You Order It.  Are Other Retailers
Doomed?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Jan. 30. 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
wonkblog/wp/2014/01/30/amazon-wants-to-send-stuff-before-you-order-it-are-other-retail-
ers-doomed/.
21 DATA BROKERS, supra note 17, at 47 (“[D]ata brokers hold a vast array of informa- R
tion on individual consumers.  For example, one of the nine data brokers has 3000 data
segments for nearly every U.S. consumer.”); see also id. at 21 (outlining some data segment
examples).
22 Id. at 19 (“[T]he data brokers use not only the raw data that they obtain from their
sources, such as a person’s name, address, home ownership status, age, income range, or
ethnicity (‘actual data elements’), but they also derive additional data (‘derived data ele-
ments’).  For example, a data broker might infer that an individual with a boating license
has an interest in boating, that a consumer has a technology interest based on the
purchase of a Wired magazine subscription, that a consumer has an interest in shoes
because she visited Zappos.com, or that a consumer who has bought two Ford cars has
loyalty to that brand.”).
23 See infra Part II.
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access to information about jurors, leading to more diverse juries and jury
venires, and potentially less discriminatory jury selection practices.
At the same time, court usage of big data technology carries real risks.
Traditional jury roles and values, including the continued legitimacy of the
jury system itself, are at stake.24  Big data threatens to disrupt, improve, and
re-imagine jury selection, just as it will affect other areas of our lives.
Increased big data collection of personal information involves an invasion of
privacy that, if embraced by the court system, could result in significant back-
lash against jury service.  Issues of juror privacy continue to increase as new
technologies allow lawyers and the public to learn about the nameless, face-
less citizens called to service.25  Potential jurors might find the idea of the
court having access to this personal data (even if otherwise publicly accessi-
ble) so unpalatable as to undermine cooperation with the existing jury sys-
tem.26  In addition, the idea of the juror constituting a representative “data
point,” rather than serving as a representative of the larger community, runs
counter to the traditional ideal of the juror as the community conscience.27
This affirmative targeting of classes of jurors also presents thorny constitu-
tional issues, as considerations of race, gender, or ethnicity could run into
equal protection problems.28  Equalizing the availability of big data informa-
tion about jurors, and making it a part of the jury selection system, raises
practical, theoretical, and constitutional dilemmas which must be addressed.
Part I of this Article looks at the longstanding problems of diversity and
discrimination in the jury selection process, with a focus on how the existing
system limits the available information about jurors.29  Currently, the jury
selection system relies on very basic, almost uninformed data—here termed
“dim data.”  Courts use this purposely shadowed and opaque dim data in an
effort to avoid past discriminatory practices and equal protection scrutiny.30
This approach necessarily limits the information available to courts and the
parties.  With the exception of Sixth Amendment fair cross-section chal-
24 See infra Section III.C.
25 See infra Section III.B.
26 See infra Section III.B.
27 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The very essence of the jury’s function is its role as
spokesman for the community conscience in determining whether or not blame can be
imposed.”).
28 Richard M. Re, Note, Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal Representa-
tion and Enfranchisement in the American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568, 1580 (2007)
(“Demographic conceptions suggest a greater role for selected competence by focusing on
the benefits generated by including particular group members in petit juries.  In so doing,
demographic conceptions take a step away from impartiality.  At the extreme, a perfect
understanding of the relationship between group membership and jury deliberations
would permit jury-reforming officials to influence verdicts by changing the input of juror
group membership.”).
29 See infra Part I.
30 See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal Protection and Jury Selection: Denying
that Race Still Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 511, 513.
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lenges and Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges, courts
choose to operate largely in the dark when it comes to who serves on juries.31
Further, even within fair cross-section challenges, courts have disagreed on
the appropriate analytical approach to remedy the defect of unrepresentative
jury venires.32
Compounding the issue, there exists the problem of discrimination in
the peremptory challenge stage.33  While formal racial discrimination ended
with Batson v. Kentucky,34 and formal gender discrimination ended with J.E.B.
v. Alabama,35 scholars and practitioners acknowledge that race and gender
considerations still influence the use of peremptory strikes.36  These discrimi-
natory practices result, in part, from the lack of information provided to law-
yers about jurors.37  Simply put, one reason why lawyers strike jurors based
on the proxies of racial or gender stereotypes is because no better informa-
tion is available.  Consequently, despite great advances in creating larger,
more diverse jury pools, concerns about racial or gender diversity within
actual jury panels remain.38
Part II looks at the potential of “bright data” to respond to the problems
of diversity and discrimination by providing more detailed information about
potential jurors.  This personal information already exists, is easily accessible,
and could improve the diversity of jury venires and jury panels.  Big data
knows the demographic makeup of a community better than the court sys-
tem does.39  Big data companies regularly target zip codes, neighborhoods,
households and even individuals based on numerous data points.40  Big data
has become a big business precisely because it can target predicted interests,
sensibilities, and attitudes.41  For jury administrators, this not only offers
greater access to increased diversity in the jury venire, but information about
whom (or what type(s) of person(s)) is not appearing for jury service.  As
31 See infra Part I.
32 Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329 (2010); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496
n.17 (1977); United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154, 1160–66 (9th Cir. 2014)
(en banc).
33 Caren Myers Morrison, Negotiating Peremptory Challenges, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 1, 5 (2014); see also infra subsection I.A.2.
34 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
35 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
36 See, e.g., Leslie Ellis & Shari Seidman Diamond, Race, Diversity, and Jury Composition:
Battering and Bolstering Legitimacy, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1033 (2003); Nancy J. King, The
Effects of Race-Conscious Jury Selection on Public Confidence in the Fairness of Jury Proceedings: An
Empirical Puzzle, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1177 (1994).
37 See infra Section I.C.
38 See infra Section I.A.
39 See infra Section II.A.
40 See generally DATA BROKERS, supra note 17. R
41 Reed Albergotti, Big Data, Big Dollars: Palantir Valued at $9 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
5, 2013), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230349780457924050107
8423362; Katy Bachman, Big Data Added $156 Billion in Revenue to Economy Last Year,
ADWEEK (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/big-data-added-156-
billion-revenue-economy-last-year-153107.
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“jury yields” (meaning the number of summoned jurors who show up to
court)42 have decreased in jurisdictions across the country, courts have
begun recognizing that jury management systems need updating.43  Target-
ing jurors to diversify the venire will necessarily result in additional informa-
tion useful to court administrators trying to increase the efficacy of the jury
summoning system.
In addition, these individualized predictive correlations about potential
jurors could provide valuable information to litigants in the adversarial sys-
tem.44  For defendants who have liberty at stake or companies facing signifi-
cant financial risk, identifying sympathetic members of the jury will be both a
comfort and a tactical advantage.45  Instead of knowing a juror is a twenty-
three-year-old, white woman who works as a nurse, litigants in a big data
world might know that the juror also reads parenting magazines, but not
news magazines, recently went bankrupt, votes Republican, owns a licensed
gun, and gives to religious charities.  In some cases, that additional, public,
relatively benign information may help make a more accurate predictive
judgment about who would be a more suitable juror.  This Part lays out the
possibilities of how “bright data” could impact jury selection and the jury
system.
Part II also examines how such a system incorporating bright data might
be implemented.  Basic jury venire practices are just beginning to adapt to
the technological age.46  Jury lists generally derive from state databases,
including motor vehicle records, voting registries, and government benefit
recipient lists.47  Any big data record on an individual includes some of the
same variables that these data points represent.48  In fact, most data collec-
tion companies start by collecting available public records, including the
42 GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, THE STATE-OF-THE-STATES
SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 20 (2007), http://
cdm16501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/juries/id/112 (“The term ‘jury yield’
refers to the number of citizens who are found to be qualified and available for jury service
expressed as a percentage of the total number of qualification questionnaires or sum-
monses mailed.”).
43 Shaun Bowler et al., GOTJ: Get Out the Juror, 36 POL. BEHAV. 515, 516–17 (2013).
44 Jonathan M. Redgrave & Jason J. Stover, The Information Age, Part II: Juror Investiga-
tion on the Internet—Implications for the Trial Lawyer, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 211, 211 (2001).
45 Id.
46 Bowler et al., supra note 43, at 516–17. R
47 MIZE ET AL., supra note 42, at 13 (“For those states that mandate which source lists to R
use, the ones that occur most frequently are the voter registration list (38 states) and the
licensed driver list (35 states). . . . Nineteen states mandate the use of a combined voter/
driver list.  Eleven mandate the use of three or more lists—typically, registered voters,
licensed drivers, and state income or property tax lists, although other combinations are
also common.  Seven states restrict the number of source lists to a single list: Mississippi
and Montana mandate the use of the registered voters list only; Florida, Michigan, Nevada,
and Oklahoma mandate the use of the licensed drivers list only; and Massachusetts
employs a unique statewide census for its master jury list.”).
48 DATA BROKERS, supra note 17, at iv–v (“[C]ategories include those that primarily R
focus on ethnicity and income levels, such as ‘Urban Scramble’ and ‘Mobile Mixers,’ both
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same datasets that help create official jury lists.49  This Part briefly highlights
how current technologies could be linked with existing court practices.
Part III examines the dilemma this type of bright data presents to the
jury system.  The decision about whether to incorporate available big data
into the jury selection process exposes several tensions in the jury system
itself.  Do jurors exist to resolve cases between parties or do they represent
the community as part of the constitutional structure?  Does juror privacy
outweigh litigants’ desire to know more information about potential jurors?
Would the incorporation of more personal data into the jury system have
negative or unintended consequences to the perceived legitimacy of the jury
system?  Would increased access to information about jurors prevent real, if
unacknowledged, racial or gender discrimination, or would this new data just
provide different proxies to justify the same unconstitutional strikes?50
Would better information about jurors change the outcome in any particular
case?  Would court administrators run afoul of the Equal Protection Clause
by intentionally considering race and gender?51  These questions are raised
and answered to provide a framework for analysis for courts and scholars
interested in considering the adoption of big data within the jury system.
The Article concludes by asking whether such a big data-based system, if
possible, should be adopted.  The fact that a technology exists and could be
feasibly integrated into the court system does not answer the question of
whether the system should be encouraged.  Court administrators and judges
will soon need to make these decisions as the temptations of big data are
growing and will need to be evaluated and acted upon.
I. JURY SELECTION DESIGN: A SYSTEM OF “DIM DATA”
This Part briefly reviews the problem of jury diversity and discrimination
with the goal of identifying the information deficits that arise from the cur-
rent jury selection system.  Dozens of wonderful articles, books, and historical
projects have been devoted to the evolution of jury equality.52  This Part
merely canvasses that rich literature as a framework to study the data
problems arising from the current legal standards.  As will be discussed, in a
of which include a high concentration of Latinos and African Americans with low
incomes.”).
49 See infra subsection III.A.2.
50 See infra Section III.D.
51 See infra Section III.E.
52 See, e.g., ABRAMSON, supra note 5, at 25; Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The R
Hybrid Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 916–17 (1998); Barbara Allen Bab-
cock, A Place in the Palladium: Women’s Rights and Jury Service, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1139,
1147–48 (1993); Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and Polit-
ics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 325, 355 (1995); James Forman, Jr., Juries and Race in
the Nineteenth Century, 113 YALE L.J. 895, 910–14 (2004); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to the
Jury at a Crossroad: The American Experience, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909, 923 (2003); Gretchen
Ritter, Jury Service and Women’s Citizenship Before and After the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW &
HIST. REV. 479, 481 (2002).
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well-meaning effort to design a jury in an impartial, non-discriminatory man-
ner, courts and legislatures have shielded themselves from valuable informa-
tion about jurors, with limiting and distorting consequences.  The current
jury selection system relies on a purposely shrouded and opaque process that
blinds court systems and litigants to more information.
A. Designing an Inclusive Jury Venire
The jury has long mirrored the promise and problems of American
equality.53  Battles over jury diversity have paralleled the battles over equality
after the Reconstruction Amendments, the Nineteenth Amendment, and the
civil rights and women’s rights movements.54  As the idea of citizenship
expanded to reflect the gains of these successful social movements, so did the
problems of selecting a jury that represented this new democratic polity.55
In direct response to a history of jury selection dominated by exclusion-
ary “key man system[s]”56 and “blue ribbon juries”57 which subjectively, arbi-
trarily, and discriminatorily restricted which citizens were picked from the
jury rolls, the modern jury system strives to be objective and random.58  The
federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 mandates random selection of
citizens from certain governmentally maintained lists.59  Because of this fed-
eral law, and its influence in state systems, most courts randomly select jurors
from specific lists of official government records.60  Generally, federal courts
rely on voter registration lists to assemble juror names.61  Some districts have
53 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Jury as Constitutional Identity, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1105, 1121–35 (2014).
54 Id.
55 Dooley, supra note 52, at 355; Marder, supra note 52, at 922–23. R
56 Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 203, 207 n.26 (1995) (“Under a key man system, citizens of good reputation in the
community (the ‘key’ men) recommend persons to fill the jury venire.”).
57 Franklin Strier, The Educated Jury: A Proposal for Complex Litigation, 47 DEPAUL L. REV.
49, 58 (1997) (“In the United States, special ‘blue ribbon’ juries were common in the first
half of the twentieth century, but fell into desuetude thereafter.” (footnote omitted)).
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2012).
59 Id. § 1863.
60 MIZE ET AL., supra note 42, at 13 (“[T]he choice of source lists is an important policy
decision for state courts insofar that it establishes the inclusiveness and the initial demo-
graphic characteristics of the potential jury pool.  Thirty states mandate that courts within
the jurisdiction use only the designated source lists, while 15 states and the District of
Columbia permit local courts to supplement the required lists with additional lists.  The
remaining five states do not mandate the use of any specific source list, but enumerate the
permissible lists that can be employed for this purpose.” (footnote omitted)); Paula Han-
naford-Agor, Systematic Negligence in Jury Operations: Why the Definition of Systematic Exclusion
in Fair Cross Section Claims Must Be Expanded, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 761, 780 (2011) (“The use of
multiple source lists to improve the demographic representation of the master jury list is
perhaps the most significant step courts have undertaken since they abandoned the key-
man system in favor of random selection from broad-based lists.”).
61 28 U.S.C § 1863(b)(2) (2012) (“[P]rospective jurors shall be selected from the voter
registration lists or the lists of actual voters of the political subdivisions within the district or
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supplemented voter registration lists with names of persons holding a driver’s
license or state identification card.62  Many state courts compile jury lists
from driver’s license data,63 tax information,64 public utility customer infor-
mation,65 and other sources,66 such as unemployment or public benefits
lists.67
division.  The plan shall prescribe some other source or sources of names in addition to
voter lists where necessary to foster the policy and protect the rights secured by sections
1861 and 1862 of this title.”).
62 See generally MIZE ET AL., supra note 42, at 14 (“21 states permit courts to supplement
the mandated lists with additional source lists including state and local income or property
tax rolls, unemployment . . . lists . . . and ‘other’ lists.  In most instances, ‘other’ referred to
state identification card holders, which is often maintained by the same agency that main-
tains the list of licensed drivers.”); Andrew J. Lievense, Note, Fair Representation on Juries in
the Eastern District of Michigan: Analyzing Past Efforts and Recommending Future Action, 38 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 941, 947 (2005) (arriving at the same conclusion).
63 See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1628(1) (2015) (“[T]he officer having charge of the
election records shall furnish to the jury commissioner a complete list of the names, dates
of birth, addresses, and motor vehicle operator license numbers or state identification card
numbers of all registered electors nineteen years of age or older in the county.”); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 38-5-3 (West 2015) (“The director of the motor vehicle division of the taxa-
tion and revenue department shall make available by electronic media to the department
of information technology a database of driver’s license holders in each county, which shall
be updated every six months.”); Ronald Randall et al., Racial Representativeness of Juries: An
Analysis of Source List and Administrative Effects on the Jury Pool, 29 JUST. SYS. J., 71, 72 (2008)
(“A combined voter/driver list is required in nineteen states, and three or more lists are
mandated in eleven states.  It is difficult to know precisely how many jurisdictions in the
United States use drivers’ lists or registered voters’ lists exclusively because of the discre-
tion left to local jurisdictions in many states.” (citations omitted)).
64 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-2-301(a) (2015) (“The jury commission for each
county shall compile and maintain a master jury list consisting of the current voter registra-
tion list for the county supplemented with names from other lists of persons resident
therein, such as lists of utility customers, property taxpayers, motor vehicle registrations,
drivers’ licenses, and state identification cards, which the supreme court from time to time
designates.”).
65 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 2-206(1) (2015) (“The jury commission for each county
shall compile and maintain a master jury list consisting of the current voter registration list
for the county supplemented with names from other lists of persons resident therein, such
as lists of utility customers, property taxpayers, motor vehicle registrations, drivers’ licenses,
and state identification cards, which the supreme court from time to time designates.”);
IOWA CODE § 607A.22(2) (2015) (“The appointive jury commission or the jury manager
may use any other current comprehensive list of persons residing in the county, including
but not limited to the lists of public utility customers, which the appointive jury commis-
sion or jury manager determines are useable for the purpose of a juror source list.”).
66 Randall et al., supra note 63, at 75 (“[S]ome jurisdictions do supplement their main
source list (voters’ lists, drivers’ lists, or both) with ‘residents (according to state census),
utility and telephone customers, newly naturalized citizens, property owners, motor vehicle
owners, and state taxpayers, including welfare and unemployment recipients.’” (citation
omitted) (quoting JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS 35 (G. Thomas Munsterman et al. eds.,
1997))).
67 See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 60, at 780 (“[T]he vast majority of state courts and a
sizeable number of federal courts have adopted the use of multiple lists as the starting
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Persons on these lists comprise the jury wheels from which courts select
individual jury venires for jury summons,68 and also serve as the basis for
constitutional challenges when these lists do not create adequately represen-
tative juries.69  While designed to be non-discriminatory, diversity within the
jury venire often does not match the diversity of the local population, mean-
ing that the jury venire does not match the demographic make-up of the
community.70
The Supreme Court has considered jury venire challenges arising from
both Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment claims.  Each has a
separate history which will be addressed in turn, but both lines of cases have
led courts to limit the type of information known about jurors.
1. Sixth Amendment—Impartial Jury
Textually, the only hint of the type of jury envisioned by the founders is
the language in the Sixth Amendment, which requires an “impartial” jury.71
Originally, an impartial jury meant a jury lacking bias toward the parties.72
However, as the pool of jurors became democratized, the Supreme Court
redefined an impartial jury to mean one reflecting a cross-section of the com-
point for a defensible jury system.  Forty-three states and the District of Columbia permit
the use of two or more source lists to compile master jury lists, of which thirty-one mandate
the use of at least two lists and eleven mandate the use of three or more lists—typically,
registered voter, licensed driver, and state income or property tax lists.”); Robert C. Wal-
ters et al., Jury of Our Peers: An Unfulfilled Constitutional Promise, 58 S.M.U. L. REV. 319, 352
(2005) (“To reach more people, court officials added lists from New York State income tax
payers and state unemployment and welfare rolls.”).
68 Mary R. Rose & Jeffrey B. Abramson, Data, Race, and the Courts: Some Lessons on
Empiricism from Jury Representation Cases, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 911, 915, 918–20, 949–50
(discussing different types of jury wheels and jury summonsing techniques).
69 Chernoff, supra note 6, at 143–44.
70 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Repre-
sentation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 356 (1999) (“Even when they are contacted, minority
residents are less likely to complete a jury questionnaire or to respond to a jury summons
due to apathy or resentment toward a criminal justice system from which many feel
alienated.”).
71 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed . . . .”); Mark Cammack, In Search of the Post-Positivist Jury,
70 IND. L.J. 405, 428 (1995) (“Indeed, impartiality is the only defining feature of the jury
that is mentioned anywhere in the Constitution.”).  Of course, at the time of the Founding,
only white men of property could serve on juries.
72 Caren Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1618–19 (2011) (“At com-
mon law, jurors were ‘impartial,’ not because they knew nothing about the case, but simply
because they had no family ties to any of the parties and no financial interest in the out-
come.”).  This understanding of impartiality still exists, but has been supplemented by
other considerations as well. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (defining
“impartial jury” to be a jury “capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence
before it”).
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munity.73  As the Supreme Court stated in Taylor v. Louisiana, “[t]he unmis-
takable import of this Court’s opinions, at least since 1940 and not
repudiated by intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury from a
representative cross section of the community is an essential component of
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.”74
The current test for an impartial jury adopts this fair cross-section defini-
tion.75  The court’s focus has been on a representative jury venire, and not the
ultimate composition of the actual jury panel.76  And, at least in criminal
cases, the fair cross-section requirement provides an attempt at a representa-
tive jury panel.77  Because the Seventh Amendment controls civil cases, the
Supreme Court has never had to formally apply the impartiality/fair cross-
section language to civil juries.78  However, federal statutory law—The Jury
73 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American tradition of trial by
jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily con-
templates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community.”); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (“The very idea of a jury is a body of men com-
posed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights it is selected or summoned to
determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status
in society as that which he holds.”), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
74 Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527–28 (citation omitted); id. at 527 (“[I]t is part of the estab-
lished tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body
truly representative of the community.” (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130
(1940))).
75 Id. at 530 (“We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury
trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has
solid foundation.”); see also Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174–75 (1986); Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972) (plurality opinion); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 410 (1972)
(plurality opinion); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942) (acknowledging “the concept of the jury as a cross section of the
community”).
76 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990) (“The Sixth Amendment requirement
of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which
the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).”); Lockhart, 476
U.S. at 173 (“We have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle . . . to require petit
juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community at
large.”); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[W]e impose no requirement
that petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinc-
tive groups in the population.  Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular
composition . . . .”).
77 Chernoff, supra note 6, at 143–44 (“The fair cross-section standard reflects the
Court’s recognition that—separate and independent from the harm of discrimination—
the absence of any distinctive group in the community ‘deprives the jury of a perspective
on human events’ that may be critical to evaluating a criminal case.” (quoting Peters, 407
U.S. at 503–04 (1972)); see id. at 144 (“When juries are not selected from a fair cross-
section of the community and thus fail to fairly and reasonably represent distinctive groups
in the community like African-Americans and Hispanics, the defendant’s Sixth Amend-
ment right to an impartial jury is violated.”).
78 Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 377, 464 n.366 (1996) (“The Court’s discussions of the need for a representative
jury in the context of civil litigation have been infrequent, and significantly, the Supreme
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Selection and Service Act—imposes a fair cross-section requirement, so
jurors who are summoned for both criminal and civil trials (at the same
time) are—as a practical matter—randomly selected in the same non-dis-
criminatory manner.79
Despite a random selection system, fair cross-section challenges regularly
occur.80  The leading fair cross-section case remains Duren v. Missouri.81  In
Duren the Court set forth a three-part test:
In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section require-
ment, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is
a “distinctive” group in the community; (2) that the representation of this
group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in
relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this
underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-
selection process.82
For Sixth Amendment purposes, a “distinctive group” involves tradition-
ally unrepresented groups (e.g., women, African-Americans, Latinos).83  To
Court has never used the Constitution to condemn civil jury selection practices that result
in deviation from the fair cross-section standard.”); see also Fleming v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
397 F. App’x 249, 249 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right to a [federal] jury trial in civil cases is
based in the Seventh Amendment, not the Sixth, and the Supreme Court has not recog-
nized a Constitutional mandate that jury pools in civil cases reflect a fair cross-section of
the community.”).
79 See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 53,
54–55 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861–69 (2012)) (noting that “[i]t is the policy of the
United States that all litigants in Federal courts entitled to trial by jury shall have the right
to grand and petit juries selected at random from a fair cross section of the community in
the district or division wherein the court convenes,” suggesting jury selection lists be cre-
ated from voter lists and other sources necessary to ensure a fair cross-section of the com-
munity).  In addition, the Supreme Court, using its supervisory powers over the federal
courts, has suggested that impartiality applies to civil cases. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328
U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (“The American tradition of trial by jury, considered in connection
with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily contemplates an impartial jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community.” (emphasis added)).
80 See Chernoff, supra note 6, at 143–44.
81 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
82 Id. at 364.
83 Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 999 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc) (“The Duren court used
the concept of ‘distinctive group’ in a case where women were subjected to discrimination.
It is fair to assume that the court wanted to give heightened scrutiny to groups needing
special protection, not to all groups generally.  There is nothing to indicate that it meant
to take the further step of requiring jury venires to reflect mathematically precise cross
sections of the communities from which they are selected.  Yet if the age classification is
adopted, surely blue-collar workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts, and an endless vari-
ety of other classifications will be entitled to similar treatment.  These are not the groups
that the court has traditionally sought to protect from under-representation on jury
venires.”); Hannaford-Agor, supra note 60, at 766 (“A ‘distinctive’ group for fair cross sec-
tion purposes often encompasses groups that see themselves as distinct from other groups,
are seen by others as a distinct group, and hold values not necessarily held by other groups.
Many court opinions also refer to these groups using equal protection terminology of ‘cog-
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find a cross-section violation, this group must be underrepresented relative to
its representation in the pool of potentially eligible jurors in the commu-
nity.84  In addition, this lack of diversity must result from systemic flaws.85
Since Duren, courts have struggled to define the threshold for determin-
ing when a fair cross-section violation occurs, and even the appropriate ana-
lytical framework for making such a determination.86  If jury venires cannot
perfectly match the makeup of the population, what level of disparity should
courts accept?  Federal courts have been unable to agree on a test, debating
the comparative merits of an “absolute disparity test,”87 a “disparity of risk
test,”88 an “absolute impact test,”89 and a standard deviation test.90  The
nizable’ groups.”); see, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (“His only claim
is the right to be indicted and tried by juries from which all members of his class are not
systematically excluded—juries selected from among all qualified persons regardless of
national origin or descent.  To this much, he is entitled by the Constitution.”); United
States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Jews are a cognizable group . . . .”);
State v. Fulton, 566 N.E.2d 1195, 1201 (Ohio 1991) (“In construing the standard set forth
in Duren we find that members of the Old Order Amish religious faith do comprise a
‘distinctive’ group.”).
84 Rose & Abramson, supra note 68, at 918 (“Whether a ‘distinctive group’ is under-
represented in the jury pools of the Southern District of California requires a comparison
between (1) a group’s representation in the larger community—the definition of which
might vary but typically is limited to the community of people eligible to serve on a jury
(for example, over 18 and a U.S. citizen); and (2) that group’s representation on the
master jury wheel—the list of names from which individuals are randomly summoned to
serve on grand and petit juries.” (footnote omitted)).
85 Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 192–93 (1946) (“The American tradition of
trial by jury, considered in connection with either criminal or civil proceedings, necessarily
contemplates an impartial jury drawn from a cross-section of the community. . . .
[P]rospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic and intentional
exclusion of any of these groups.” (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946))).
The Court based its decision in Ballard on its supervisory powers of the federal courts, not
on constitutional grounds.
86 See United States v. Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc).
87 Id. at 1160 (“The absolute disparity test . . . examines the difference between the
percentage of the distinctive group in the community and the percentage of that group in
the jury pool.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
88 Commonwealth v. Arriaga, 781 N.E.2d 1253, 1265 (Mass. 2003) (testing “the likeli-
hood that the difference between a group’s representation in the jury pool and its popula-
tion in the community will result in a significant risk that the jury will not fairly represent
the group”).
89 Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1162 (“Closely related to the absolute disparity test is
the absolute impact test.  Under this approach, the initial calculation is the same as for the
absolute disparity test.  However, the resulting number is then multiplied by the number of
persons on the particular panel.”); see also United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 588 n.11
(10th Cir. 1976) (discussing absolute impact test).
90 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977) (testing the “measure of the
predicted fluctuations from the expected value”). But see United States v. Rioux, 97 F.3d
648, 655 (2d Cir. 1996) (“It is illogical to apply a theory based on random selection when
assessing the constitutionality of a qualified wheel.  By definition, the qualified wheel is not
the product of random selection; it entails reasoned disqualifications based on numerous
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Supreme Court has acknowledged the general confusion about these stan-
dards without offering a remedy.91  Courts have drawn arbitrary lines about
the acceptable level of disparity, generally permitting an acceptable absolute
disparity of 7.7% to 10%.92  As constitutional markers of discrimination,
these percentages are difficult to justify.  Worse still, these percentages leave
certain groups who comprise a percentage of the population smaller than
the acceptable absolute disparity unable to ever bring a fair cross-section
challenge.93  Other mathematical and statistical concerns also exist with the
current tests.94
For purposes of this Article, three conclusions are relevant to the quality
and utility of information obtained through the current jury selection system.
First, the effort to avoid subjective selection methods by using random selec-
tion from objectively designed lists has had the unintended consequence of
limiting courts’ knowledge of potential jurors to the basic identifying demo-
graphic information contained in governmental lists.  Second, because only
“distinctive groups” can raise Sixth Amendment claims, courts have avoided
studying or analyzing other types of diversity in the jury venire.  Third,
because a fair cross-section has no easy definition, courts have so far been
unable to agree on an appropriate legal standard, leaving both the doctrine
in disarray and the problem unsolved.  Dim data has created a real problem
in generating a fully representative jury venire and even worse, because of
the lack of information, courts are not in a position to remedy the issue.
2. Fourteenth Amendment—Equal Protection
In addition to a Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury venire, the
Court has also recognized an equal protection right to be free from unlawful
discrimination in the selection of the venire.95  This Fourteenth Amendment
factors.  It is irrational to gauge the qualified wheel—an inherently non-random sample—
by its potential for randomness.”).
91 Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 329 (2010) (declining to specify “the method or
test courts must use to measure the representation of distinctive groups in jury pools”).
92 Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1162 (discussing the current state of flux in the law).
93 United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 944 n.10 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The neces-
sary implication of this margin is that if a distinctive group makes up 7.7% or less of the
community, then the fair cross-section requirement offers no redress even if that group is
entirely shut out of the jury pool.”).
94 Hernandez-Estrada, 749 F.3d at 1162 (“The absolute disparity test has been used by
many courts because it is easy to administer. . . . However, no court has been able to
articulate or defend it on any sound statistical basis.”); Serena v. Mock, 547 F.3d 1051, 1054
n.2 (9th Cir. 2008) (“We question, however, whether the approach compelled by our case
law [i.e., the absolute disparity approach] is mathematically sound.”).
95 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana,
419 U.S. 522 (1975) (“[T]he statute of West Virginia, discriminating in the selection of
jurors, as it does, against negroes because of their color, amounts to a denial of the equal
protection of the laws to a colored man when he is put upon trial for an alleged offence
against the State. . . .”); see also Chernoff, supra note 6, at 150 (“Up until 1975, the Supreme
Court had primarily relied on the Equal Protection Clause when evaluating the constitu-
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protection remains analytically separate from the Sixth Amendment.96  The
Equal Protection Clause applies to both civil and criminal venires, and also
protects the rights of potential jurors (not simply defendants) in securing a
jury constituted in a non-discriminatory manner.97
To establish an equal protection violation the movant must first show
that the group allegedly excluded from the venire is a “recognizable, distinct
class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as
applied.”98  Second, the movant must show that the procedure employed
tional requirements for racially representative juries, and intertwined Sixth and Four-
teenth Amendment doctrine when discussing the fair cross-section right.”); see generally
J.E.B v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994) (“Intentional discrimination on
the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal Protection Clause. . . .”); Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (extending Batson’s prohibitions to defense counsel’s
exercise of peremptory challenges); Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371–72 (1991)
(“[A] policy of striking all who speak a given language, without regard to the particular
circumstances of the trial or the individual responses of the jurors, may be found by the
trial judge to be a pretext for racial discrimination.”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89,
96 (1986) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
government exercise of peremptory challenges solely because of juror’s race, and allows
court to find purposeful discrimination based solely on jury selection in the case at bar).
96 Chernoff, supra note 6, at 141 (“Instead, a defendant can establish a prima facie
violation [of the Sixth Amendment] by showing that the underrepresentation of a distinc-
tive group in the jury pool is inherent in the selection process, whether by accident or
design.  The equal protection clause, in contrast, demands evidence of discriminatory
intent.”).
97 See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (“Undoubtedly, the overriding
interest in eradicating discrimination from our civic institutions suffers whenever an indi-
vidual is excluded from making a significant contribution to governance on account of his
race.  Yet the ‘harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the
defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community.  Selection procedures
that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the
fairness of our system of justice.’” (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 87)); id. (“For racial dis-
crimination to result in the exclusion from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not
only violates our Constitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.” (quoting Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940))); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991) (holding that
even in the context of the government’s racially discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges, “[a]n individual juror does not have a right to sit on any particular petit jury, but he
or she does possess the right not to be excluded from one on account of race”); Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 470 (1953) (“Discriminations against a race by barring or limiting
citizens of that race from participation in jury service are odious to our thought and our
Constitution.  This has long been accepted as the law.”).
98 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977); see also, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (“Our prior jury-representativeness cases . . . have involved such
groups as blacks, women, and Mexican-Americans. . . . [E]xclusion . . . on the basis of some
immutable characteristic such as race, gender, or ethnic background, undeniably gave rise
to an ‘appearance of unfairness.’” (citations omitted)); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475,
479 (1954) (“The exclusion of otherwise eligible persons from jury service solely because
of their ancestry or national origin is discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
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resulted in a substantial underrepresentation of the excluded class for a sig-
nificant period of time.99  Whereas a defendant raising a fair cross-section
challenge need only show that such underrepresentation resulted from sys-
tematic exclusion of the excluded group, a movant raising an equal protec-
tion challenge must show not only disparate impact, but discriminatory
intent.100  A movant can satisfy their burden of proving this prong of a prima
facie case by showing that “a selection procedure . . . is susceptible [to] abuse
or is not racially neutral,” and by making a necessary statistical showing.101  If
a movant meets the burden of proving their prima facie case, the defendant
must present evidence to show that they did not have a discriminatory pur-
pose, or “that such purpose did not have a determinative effect.”102  If the
defendant succeeds in such a showing, the equal protection claim fails.  If the
defendant fails to meet this burden, the equal protection claim succeeds.
In recent years, few equal protection claims have been litigated, as exam-
ples of overt discriminatory intent have thankfully become quite rare.  How-
ever, because jury venire lists originate from the same source lists, with
equally limited information, many of the same problems are relevant to the
equal protection analysis.  In both the Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment cases, information about jurors is limited to traditional concep-
tions of discrimination.
B. Designing a Non-Discriminatory Petit Jury
Beyond the jury venire, courts have also addressed discriminatory prac-
tices of striking individual jurors from the petit jury based on race and gen-
der.  Much has been written about Batson v. Kentucky103 and J.E.B. v.
Alabama104 and the Supreme Court’s systematic approach to prohibiting per-
emptory strikes based on race and gender in criminal105 and civil106 cases
99 Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494 (“[T]he defendant must show that the procedure
employed resulted in substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable
group to which he belongs.”).
100 Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (“Proof of racially discriminatory
intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
101 Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
102 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (“[Statistical evidence of disparity sug-
gesting discriminatory purpose] is subject to rebuttal evidence either that discriminatory
purpose was not involved or that such purpose did not have a determinative effect.”).
103 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
104 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994) (holding that “gender, like race, is an unconstitutional
proxy for juror competence and impartiality”).
105 Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 124.
106 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630 (1991) (holding that Batson
applies in civil trials).
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and by all parties.107  The Supreme Court has emphatically stated that race
and gender are impermissible grounds to use peremptory strikes.108
Batson and its progeny also require a three-step procedure to evaluate
the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.  First, the moving party
must establish that a peremptory strike was based on purposeful discrimina-
tion.109  If the moving party makes this initial showing, the responding party
must offer a neutral basis for the peremptory strike.110  The third step
requires the court to evaluate this neutral justification by analyzing the rea-
son and the credibility of the party.111  If the trial court discredits the reason
for the strike, the judge can remedy the unconstitutional action by re-seating
the juror or empaneling a new jury.112  If an appellate court finds a violation,
the case will be reversed and remanded for a new trial.113
Batson, while appealing in theory, has, in large measure, been deemed a
failure in practice.114  As most trial lawyers know, the protections of Batson
are weakly policed115 and easily evaded.116  In reality, the only limitation to
107 Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (hold-
ing that “the Constitution prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful
discrimination on the ground of race in the exercise of peremptory challenges”).
108 See supra notes 104–07.
109 Batson, 476 U.S. at 93–94 (holding this claim can be made “by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose”).
110 Id. at 98 (“[The party must] articulate a neutral explanation related to the particu-
lar case to be tried.”).
111 Id. at 98 & n.21 (requiring the court “to determine if the defendant has established
purposeful discrimination,” which “largely will turn on evaluation of credibility”).
112 Jason Mazzone, Batson Remedies, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2012) (“The Batson
Court addressed remedies in a single ambiguous footnote that identifies two possible reme-
dies: discharging the venire and selecting a new panel or reseating the improperly stricken
juror.”).
113 See, e.g., Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A] Batson/Powers
claim is a structural error that is not subject to harmless error review.”); Turner v. Marshall,
121 F.3d 1248, 1254 n.3 (9th Cir. 1997) (“There is no harmless error analysis with respect
to Batson claims.”); see also Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to
Ensnare More Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1075, 1109 (2011) (same).
114 DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 120 (1999) (“Batson has by all accounts done relatively little to eliminate the use of
race-based peremptory strikes . . . .”).
115 Nancy S. Marder, Batson Revisited, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1585, 1589 (2012) [hereinafter
Marder, Batson Revisited] (“One reason Batson was so ineffectual was that lawyers quickly
learned which reasons to give and which ones to avoid.”); see also id. at 1592 (“Another
reason that Batson and its progeny have been so ineffective is that trial judges are reluctant
to find Batson violations, and appellate judges are deferential to trial judges’
determinations.”).
116 Id. at 1590–91 (“In some courtrooms, they could say that the prospective juror lived
in a neighborhood where there was a lot of drug activity and the case involved drugs.  They
could also exclude prospective jurors because of their professions, clothing, or the way they
wore their hair.  As these reasons suggest, almost any reason that is not explicitly about
race will suffice.” (footnotes omitted)); Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and
Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827, 843 (2012) (“The Batson doctrine has
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striking a potential juror is a failure of imagination to come up with some
neutral, non-discriminatory reason.117  Courts have acknowledged this easy
workaround, but have not designed a solution.118
Evading Batson is not always the result of explicit or implicit bias
(although both exist).119  Sometimes, the decisions to strike a particular
juror are purely tactical120 or arbitrary.121  However, many times the decision
to exercise a peremptory strike based on observational data (like the race or
gender of a juror) results from the unavailability of other information.  As
Thaddeus Hoffmeister has noted, “[i]n recent years, obtaining additional
information about jurors through traditional voir dire has become increas-
ingly difficult.  Numerous courts across the country, citing time constraints,
have either reduced the time allocated for voir dire or switched from attor-
failed to prevent attorneys from relying on explicit bias in jury selection.  It is all too easy
for attorneys who are ‘of a mind to discriminate’ to mask their discrimination behind a
reason for their peremptory strike that is facially neutral, whatever its intent or disparate
impact.”).
117 Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1075 (listing cases and examples).
118 See, e.g., People v. Randall, 671 N.E.2d 60, 65 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (“[W]e now con-
sider the charade that has become the Batson process.  The State may provide the trial
court with a series of pat race-neutral reasons for exercise of peremptory challenges. . . .
Surely, new prosecutors are given a manual, probably entitled, ‘Handy Race-Neutral Expla-
nations’ or ‘20 Time-Tested Race-Neutral Explanations.’”); Bellin & Semitsu, supra note
113, at 1102 (“Our survey reveals that in a broad array of cases . . . attorneys articulate and
judges accept ‘race-neutral’ explanations for peremptory strikes that either highly corre-
late with race or are silly, trivial, or irrelevant to the case.  Reviewing courts then affirm
these determinations.”).
119 Roberts, supra note 116, at 833; Mimi Samuel, Focus on Batson: Let the Cameras Roll,
74 BROOK. L. REV. 95, 95 (2008) (“[A] 2005 survey revealed that every lawyer interviewed
considered race and gender when picking a jury.  Indeed, although they recognized that
such strikes are impermissible, lawyers listed some of the following stereotypes that they
rely on in jury selection: ‘Asians are conservative.  African-Americans distrust cops.  Latins
are emotional.  Jews are sentimental.  Women are hard on women . . . .’” (citations
omitted)).
120 Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 634–35 (“Professor Stephen Saltzburg, who has advo-
cated for providing attorneys with more information about prospective jurors, has offered
insight into the realities of jury selection.  ‘[M]ost lawyers resort to stereotypes, not because
they want to, but because they have to . . . . [I have] never met a lawyer who would prefer a
jury of a particular racial composition over one that will win a verdict for him.’” (alteration
in original) (citations omitted)).
121 Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of
Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 706 (1991) (“[Academic analyses of trial tactics and
other] sources provide suggestive evidence to support the conclusion that jury selection
tactics, at least those articulated by legal experts, will often be arbitrary by scientific stan-
dards.”); Brian W. Wais, Note, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Revisions to the Batson Doc-
trine and Peremptory Challenges in the Wake of Johnson v. California and Miller-El v. Dretke, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 437, 439 (2007) (“[A]ny kind of selection of jurors, particularly when a per-
son can be struck for non-legal reasons, will fundamentally be predicated on discrimina-
tion of some form.  Due to this intrinsically discriminatory nature of peremptory
challenges, discrimination can probably never be entirely eradicated from peremptory
challenges or jury selection as a whole.”).
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ney- to judge-conducted voir dire.”122  Most federal courts, and many state
courts, only provide litigants with very basic identifying information about
members of the venire (race, gender, age, zipcode or employment).123  In
these information-poor courts, a cursory voir dire and limited background
information force lawyers to make rough guesses about potential jurors in
their cases.124  Lacking additional personal information, lawyers rely upon
observational judgments that necessarily include (implicitly or explicitly)
considerations of race, gender, etc.  Because of this information gap, litigants
regularly exercise peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner.125
Even in information-rich jurisdictions that allow lengthy individual voir
dire or require juror questionnaires, information distortions arise.126  Many
jurors will not, or cannot, admit to biases under questioning.  Some jurors
forget, some lie, many simply remain silent when a direct response is
required.127  In addition, implicit biases of jurors may not even be recog-
122 Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 635.
123 Id. at 634 (“Attorneys need not offer any reason for using peremptory challenges.
This, in turn, has led attorneys—who often have very little background information on
jurors besides what they see and hear in the courtroom—to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges based on outdated stereotypes and hunches premised on a juror’s physical appear-
ance.” (footnote omitted)).
124 Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges,
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 170 (1989) (“Peremptory challenges
ensure the selection of jurors on the basis of insulting stereotypes without substantially
advancing the goal of making juries more impartial.”); Marder, Batson Revisited, supra note
115, at 1595–96 (“One difficulty is that the questions, at least in federal court, tend to be
quite cursory and to produce limited information.  Jurors are typically asked where they
reside, the nature of their work, their marital status, what their spouse does, whether they
have any children, what their children do, and whether they can be impartial.” (footnote
omitted)); Antony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremptory Chal-
lenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 254 (2005) (“Voir dire may be as limited as brief ‘yes’ or ‘no’
group questioning by the judge . . . .”).
125 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, ILLEGAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN JURY SELECTION: A CON-
TINUING LEGACY 4, 6 (2010), http://www.eji.org/files/EJI%20Race%20and%20Jury%20Re
port.pdf (finding “shocking evidence of [continuing] racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion in [8 Southern] state[s]” where “[h]undreds of people of color called for jury service
have been illegally excluded from juries after prosecutors asserted pretextual reasons to
justify their removal”); Shaila Dewan, Blacks Still Being Blocked from Juries in the South, Study
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/02/us/02jury.html
(“[T]he practice of excluding blacks and other minorities from Southern juries remains
widespread . . . .”).
126 Stephanie Clifford, TV Habits? Medical History? Tests for Jury Duty Get Personal, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/nyregion/for-service-on-
some-juries-expect-a-lengthy-written-test.html.
127 Margaret Covington, Jury Selection: Innovative Approaches to Both Civil and Criminal
Litigation, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 575, 580 (1985) (“Jurors do lie about their attitudes and
prejudices during voir dire; however, they frequently do so because they want to be
selected for the jury in order to perform their civic duty.” (footnote omitted)); Robert G.
Loewy, Note, When Jurors Lie: Differing Standards for New Trials, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 733,
739–40 (1995).
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nized or targeted by voir dire questions.  Thus, even in a jurisdiction with
seemingly open voir dire, the process may not reveal truthful answers.
Again, similar to the design of the jury venire, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions about peremptory strikes have high-minded aspirations, but harmful
effects.128  The limited information the court system provides about jurors
contributes to the problem of juror diversity.  As will be discussed in the next
Section, these dim data design flaws create clear informational imbalances.
C. The Costs of Designing Blind
As set out in the preceding Sections, in an effort to avoid the discrimina-
tory practices of the past, current jury selection systems have been designed
based on purposely limited and inexact information.  Jury lists provide only
very basic information about potential jurors.  Random selection remains
limited by random chance.  Constitutional challenges focus on historic dis-
crimination against identifiable distinctive groups.  Litigants provided with
limited personal information base their peremptory challenges on rough
proxies because nothing else is available.  In many cases, these realities were
not only expected but intended as a mechanism to ensure a colorblind sys-
tem of jury selection.
This Section seeks not to critique or debate the existing jury selection
system, but merely to examine the costs of designing a system with inexact
information in an effort to see if a smarter, big data-infused jury selection
method might improve these recognized problems.  Specifically, this Section
looks at the practical and distributional effects of designing a jury system with
limited information.
1. Practical Effects
As an empirical matter, juries do not fully represent the population of
their communities.129  Specifically, studies show that African Americans and
Latinos tend to be underrepresented, both in the venire, and in the actual
jury panel.130  Litigants continue to file lawsuits challenging the purported
128 See Charles J. Ogletree, Just Say No!: A Proposal to Eliminate Racially Discriminatory Uses
of Peremptory Challenges, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1099, 1105 (1994); Page, supra note 124, at
167–80; Tania Tetlow, Why Batson Misses the Point, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1713, 1714 (2012)
[hereinafter Tetlow, Misses the Point] (“What makes this colorblind reasoning particularly
jarring is that it directly contradicts the Court’s own ‘fair cross-section’ jurisprudence, in
which the Court assumed that diversity is our most important tool to work towards the goal
of an impartial jury.”).
129 Randall et al., supra note 63, at 71 (“Despite progress in bringing diversity to juries
in America, there is persuasive evidence that racial and ethnic minorities are consistently
underrepresented in the vast majority of both federal and state courts.” (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
130 Nina W. Chernoff & Joseph B. Kadane, The 16 Things Every Defense Attorney Should
Know About Fair Cross-Section Challenges, CHAMPION, Dec. 2013, at 14 (“There is a significant
amount of data indicating that jury systems across the country underrepresent people of
color, primarily African-Americans and Latinos.”); Rose & Abramson, supra note 68, at 931
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fair cross-section of the community.131  Professor Nina Chernoff has written
two law review articles well canvassing the failures of unrepresentative juries
in America.132
The reasons for this reality are complex, but one identifiable problem
has been the use of basic voter lists and driver’s license lists as the main
sources of potential jurors for the jury wheel.  These lists, while objective, are
incomplete and can quickly become outdated, and thus, unrepresentative of
the population.133  As long as those lists do not reflect actual demographics,
or become outdated such that jury summons fail to reach their intended
targets, the available information remains suboptimal.  The recognized fail-
ure of Batson, allowing lawyers to continue to strike jurors based on imper-
missible racial or gender grounds compounds the problem of a lack of
diversity within the venire.134  Without sufficient information, lawyers have
very little information on which to base decisions of whom to choose for their
case.  This can lead to still less racial and ethnic diversity on actual jury
panels.
Independent of issues of race and gender, courts and litigants have no
sense about the full diversity of jurors.  Because the only categories studied
(and litigated) involve basic identifying features (race, gender, ethnicity),
researchers have not examined other distinguishing features that might iden-
tify jurors.  Other types of diversity—age, religion, sexual orientation, politi-
cal affiliation, economic class, etc.—might be important to consider for a
more complete conception of diversity.  Other types of people (self-
(“As in the Southern District of California, the Middle District of Florida uses the voter
registration list as its exclusive source of names for prospective jurors.”); id. at 945 (“Voting
lists have long been criticized as unrepresentative of the population because of racial and
ethnic differences in voter registration rates, as compared to non-Hispanic whites.”).
131 See Chernoff, supra note 6, at 145 n.16, 199 (surveying 167 fair cross-section claims
in the years 2000–2011); see also Hannaford-Agor, supra note 60, at 797 (“[T]he over-
whelming majority of fair, cross section claims have failed.”); see also Nina Chernoff, Devil
in the Details: Discovering Fair Cross-Section Violations (working draft) (on file with
author) (collecting cases) [hereinafter Chernoff, Devil in the Details].
132 Chernoff, supra note 6; see also Chernoff, Devil in the Details, supra note 131 (col-
lecting cases).
133 King, supra note 13, at 714 (“When jury administrators fail to revise source lists
frequently, people who move often, particularly renters, never make it into the pool of
qualified jurors.  Because minorities are statistically more mobile than whites, a greater
percentage of minorities than whites never receive jury questionnaires mailed to outdated
addresses.” (footnotes omitted)).
134 Rose & Abramson, supra note 68, at 954 (“Currently, courts do not keep track of
demographic changes in their community.”); Tetlow, Misses the Point, supra note 128, at
1736 (“Very few practicing attorneys, or trial judges for that matter, believe Batson’s central
legal fiction that race and gender cannot predict juror belief.  Indeed, lawyers engaged in
the rank stereotyping necessary to jury selection would struggle to put the issues of race
and gender out of their heads. . . . In the context of guessing about whether a juror’s
occupation, neighborhood, dress, and body language indicate something about a juror’s
sympathies, for example, it proves very difficult to pretend that race and gender do not.”
(footnote omitted)).
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employed men who do not vote, or women with young children) are rou-
tinely missing from the venire, but no data exists on these practices because
researchers and courts have focused exclusively on groups that have been
historically discriminated against.
In addition, because the information provided to courts for jury wheels
tends to be limited and sometimes erroneous, courts do not know which
jurors fail to appear for jury duty, nor the reasons for their failure to appear.
Jury yields have remained embarrassingly low for years.135  These response
rates correlate with class and race.136  Courts have identified a clear correla-
tion between poverty and jury response rates, which in certain communities
directly correlates with race.137  While some jury no-shows involve simple
fixes in terms of updating mailing addresses, currently, courts simply do not
know enough about the jurors who fail to show up for court.138
2. Distributional Effect
In addition to being limiting, current jury selection systems also dispro-
portionately affect litigants with few financial resources.139  Litigants who can
afford to seek out more personal details about potential jurors will do so.  An
entire industry of jury consultants exists to fill this informational gap.140  As
135 See, e.g., Colleen Nelson, Texans Simply Not Showing Up for Jury Duty, NEWSCHANNEL
10 (July 11, 2014), http://www.newschannel10.com/story/25992800/texans-simply-not-
showing-up-for-jury-duty; Joseph A. Slobodzian, Dodging Jury Duty in Phila. Could Get People
Fined or Jailed, PHILLY.COM (Mar. 16, 2014, 1:09 AM), http://articles.philly.com/2014-03-
17/news/48269242_1_jury-duty-scofflaw-court-jury-commissioner.
136 Rose & Abramson, supra note 68, at 938 (“A substantial number of mailed jury ques-
tionnaires are returned by the post office as undeliverable.  Minorities and persons in pov-
erty are over-represented in this group, since they tend to move more often than other
groups.  And yet, little effort is made to update addresses or to do second mailings when
possible. . . . Across all years from 2003 to 2009 in the Middle District of Florida, return
rates for African Americans ranged from 27.9% to 40.3%; for Hispanics it was 35.8% to
46.9%.  By contrast, for whites the range across the same years was 58.5% to 68.4%.” (foot-
notes omitted)).
137 Id. at 914 (“In cases where the disappearance of minorities from jury pools is due to
factors such as patterns of undeliverable mail in poor neighborhoods or high levels of
nonresponse to jury summonses among some minorities, judges tend to consider these to
be ‘merely’ practical problems or else unavoidable facts of life that government should not
have to correct in pursuing the goal of representative juries.”).
138 See Jury Duty in America Today, DIANE REHM SHOW (Nov. 3, 2014), http://thediane
rehmshow.org/shows/2014-11-03/jury_duty_in_america_today (discussing jury yield
problems).
139 Raymond Rossi, Researching Jurors Online: Voir Dire in the Digital Age, 101 ILL. B.J. 514,
515 (2013) (“Jury consultants still play a role in high profile or moneyed cases, but counsel
may not have the resources to conduct community surveys, focus groups, or mock juries in
an effort to enhance their attempts to find the ideal juror.”); Steven C. Serio, Comment, A
Process Right Due? Examining Whether a Capital Defendant Has a Due Process Right to a Jury
Selection Expert, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1143, 1147 (2004) (“Many scholars believe that most
capital cases are won or lost during jury selection.”).
140 See infra note 142 (discussing jury consultants).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL302.txt unknown Seq: 24  4-APR-16 13:24
958 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
one commentator bluntly stated, “[n]o self-respecting trial lawyer will go
through the process of jury selection in an important case without the assis-
tance of highly paid jury consultants.”141
Scientific jury selection and jury trial consultants, which began in a
world of limited data, have thrived in an era of big data.142  Now, assistants or
paid consultants routinely conduct online research to uncover information
about jurors.143  While new technologies have allowed less well-heeled clients
to perform Internet searches, large law firms utilize the vast majority of jury
consultants.144
This distributional effect creates a tactical advantage for wealthy litigants
at the expense of poorer litigants.  While much of the American legal system
disadvantages low-income persons, due in part to the high cost of legal ser-
vices, this particular inequity arises from the lack of information provided to
the parties by the courts.  As will be discussed, courts could reduce the need
for costly jury consulting and level the playing field by providing more infor-
mation about potential jurors to parties.145
In sum, significant practical and distributional effects result from a dim
data system of jury selection.  The cost of designing a jury system blinded to
“better” information about jurors, while understandable in its historical and
legal context, nevertheless has negative consequences which can be
improved with better information.  The next Part examines what “better”
information is available.
141 Gordon T. Walker, Editorial, Lawyers Must Show Restraint if Our Jury System Is to Sur-
vive, BOS. HERALD, Oct. 22, 1995, at 35.
142 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and Do
Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178, 179 (1990); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in
an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1667, 1690 (2008) [hereinafter
Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation] (“Jury consultants increasingly run background checks on
the various prospective jurors in the pool, pulling credit reports, employing search
engines, looking for rap sheets, and examining property tax records.  In high-stakes cases,
jury consultants work with private investigators who photograph prospective jurors’ homes
and vehicles, searching for any pertinent information like a political yard sign or a relig-
ious bumper sticker.” (footnote omitted)).
143 Shannon Awsumb, Social Networking Sites: The Next E-Discovery Frontier, 66 BENCH & B.
OF MINN., 22, 23 (2009) (“Trial consultants regularly use [I]nternet research as a means of
vetting prospective jurors and learning information jurors may not reveal on jury question-
naires or during voir dire, ‘including how they vote, how they spend money[,] and if
they’ve spoken out on controversial issues.’” (citing Carol J. Williams, Jury Duty? May Want
to Edit Online Profile, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/
29/nation/na-jury29)).
144 See Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP.
L. REV. 369, 416 (1992) (“Rare is the criminal defendant who can afford to retain consul-
tants or whose case is sufficiently noteworthy to attract volunteers.”).
145 Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note 142, at 1693 (“If the government . . . essen-
tially provid[ed] dossiers on all prospective jurors, [then] one might expect to see less
discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, religion, gender, and other immutable
characteristics.”).
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II. BIG DATA AND BRIGHT DATA
In contrast to the limited personal information collected by court sys-
tems, commercial data aggregators have developed sophisticated, targeted,
and individualized dossiers of personal information on most Americans.146
Courts may know your race, age, gender, and zip code.  Companies know
your dress size, hobbies, anxieties, and shopping habits (and, of course, the
basic identifying data the courts possess).
This Part seeks to explore the rise of “big data,” or, more specifically,
what I refer to as “bright data”—“bright” because it is smart, “bright” because
it is illuminating, and “bright” because it involves a dazzling concentration of
personal data points.  Easily contrasted with dim data, purposely shaded and
out of view, bright data is defined as a large volume of personally identifying
information offering segmented, targeted, and predictive insights about indi-
viduals and groups.  As will be discussed, bright data has the potential to
remedy some of the limiting and unfair information deficits of the existing
jury selection system.  Much has already been written on how big data offers
new ways to re-imagine the world.147  This brief summary seeks to focus those
big data/bright data changes on the problems and interests of courts and
litigants seeking information about jurors.
A. What Is Big Data?
Big data has become a big news story because it offers a new way to
collect and analyze the data trails that our highly networked, digitally ori-
ented lives leave behind.148  While numerous scholars and commentators
have tried to define the term,149 broadly speaking:
146 JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY, SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A
WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 3 (2014).
147 VIKTOR MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT
WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 2 (2013).
148 See, e.g., Chris Anderson, The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method
Obsolete, WIRED (June 23, 2008), http://www.wired.com/2008/06/pb-theory/; Kenneth
Cukier, Data, Data Everywhere, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2010), http://www.economist.com/
node/15557443; Steve Lohr, How Big Data Became So Big, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/business/how-big-data-became-so-big-unboxed.html;
Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html?pagewanted=all.
149 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VAL-
UES 2 (2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_re
port_may_1_2014.pdf (“There are many definitions of ‘big data’ which may differ depend-
ing on whether you are a computer scientist, a financial analyst, or an entrepreneur pitch-
ing an idea to a venture capitalist.  Most definitions reflect the growing technological
ability to capture, aggregate, and process an ever-greater volume, velocity, and variety of
data.”); MANYIKA, ET AL., supra note 1, at 1  (“‘Big data’ refers to datasets whose size is
beyond the ability of typical database software tools to capture, store, manage, and ana-
lyze.”); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014) (“In practice, the term encom-
passes three aspects of data magnification and manipulation.  First, it refers to technology
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 Big Data is the shorthand label for the phenomenon, which embraces
technology, decision-making[,] and public policy. . . .
. . . .
Big Data is a vague term, used loosely, if often, these days.  But put sim-
ply, the catchall phrase means three things.  First, it is a bundle of technolo-
gies.  Second, it is a potential revolution in measurement.  And third, it is a
point of view, or philosophy, about how decisions will be—and perhaps
should be—made in the future.150
Big data owes its value to the ability of new computer processing technol-
ogies to analyze and study vast volumes of data.151  Government and private
entities have collected this data, and placed it in centralized, searchable
repositories, allowing for analysis of the past and prediction for the future.152
Of more relevance to this Article, big data involves a change in the col-
lection and use of consumer data.  As Professor Anita Allen summarized,
“‘Big Data’ is a nickname for enterprises that collect, analyze, package, and
that maximizes computational power and algorithmic accuracy.  Second, it describes types
of analyses that draw on a range of tools to clean and compare data.  Third, it promotes
the belief that large data sets generate results with greater truth, objectivity, and
accuracy.”).
150 Steve Lohr, Sizing Up Big Data, Broadening Beyond the Internet, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG
(June 19, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/sizing-up-big-data-broaden-
ing-beyond-the-internet/; see also MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 147, at 2.
151 Christopher Slobogin, Transactional Surveillance by the Government, 75 MISS. L.J. 139,
145 (2005) (“[A]dvances in data warehousing and data exchange technology in the finan-
cial sector allow very easy access to a virtual cornucopia of transaction-related information
that can reveal, among other things, ‘what products or services you buy; what charities,
political causes, or religious organizations you contribute to; . . . where, with whom, and
when you travel; how you spend your leisure time; . . . whether you have unusual or danger-
ous hobbies; and even whether you participate in certain felonious activities.’” (citations
omitted) (alterations in original)); Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy
and User Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 240 (2013) (“Big
data is upon us.  Over the past few years, the volume of data collected and stored by busi-
ness and government organizations has exploded.  The trend is driven by reduced costs of
storing information and moving it around in conjunction with increased capacity to
instantly analyze heaps of unstructured data using modern experimental methods, observa-
tional and longitudinal studies, and large scale simulations.” (footnotes omitted)).
152 Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note 142, at 1720 (“In many instances, the gov-
ernment has the best access to information that decisionmakers will want to use.  Criminal
records, bankruptcy records, military service records, immigration and naturalization
records, academic records from public schools or state-run universities, or records regard-
ing membership in licensed professions are obvious examples.”); Candice L. Kline, Note,
Security Theater and Database-Driven Information Markets: A Case for an Omnibus U.S. Data Pri-
vacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 443, 447 (2008) (“A byproduct of enhanced technological
capabilities is the ease with which data can be populated, aggregated, and exchanged
across an increasingly diverse set of corporate interests.  These corporate interests span the
economy and include retailers (Sears, Hallmark), pharmaceutical companies (Pfizer),
technology firms (Microsoft, IBM), banks and financial services firms (Bank One, Bank of
America), and automakers (GM, Toyota).  Data brokerage companies, such as Acxiom and
LexisNexis repackage, augment, and sell personal data on individuals to corporate and
public sector clients.” (footnotes omitted)).
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sell data, even uninteresting-looking data, to reveal tastes, habits, personality,
and market behavior.”153  Government agencies, companies, and ordinary
citizens mine this data for information that will help them understand, pre-
dict, and perhaps profit from the patterns that arise.154
What this Article terms “bright data” involves a subset of this big data
revolution.155  It involves a more narrow focus on individuals and groups
rather than broad searches for patterns in anonymous data.  Examples of
bright data collectors include behavioral marketing companies and commer-
cial data companies that use big data technologies to segment, target, and
offer predictions about individuals, families, or groups in order to sell partic-
ular goods and services.156  The goal of such collectors is to identify the inter-
ests, personalities, attributes, and likely future actions of each particular
person.  Companies currently compete to collect thousands of disparate
points of data on individuals.157  While privacy concerns have largely prod-
ded companies to collect information cognizant of the importance of de-
identifying personal identifying information, the risks exist to link this infor-
mation all together.  As will be discussed in the next Section, the quality and
quantity of data collected about individuals (or at least individuals who have
embraced digital technologies) is vast and growing.158
153 Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and Normative Practice, 126 HARV. L. REV.
FORUM 241, 246 (2013); see also Julie E. Cohen, What is Privacy For?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904,
1920 (2013) (“‘Big Data’ is shorthand for the . . . configuration of information-processing
hardware capable of sifting, sorting, and interrogating vast quantities of data . . . [and for
the process of] mining the data for patterns[ ] [and] distilling the patterns into predictive
analytics.”).
154 Jonas Lerman, Big Data and Its Exclusions, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 57 (2013)
(“Big data, for all its technical complexity, springs from a simple idea: gather enough
details about the past, apply the right analytical tools, and you can find unexpected con-
nections and correlations, which can help you make unusually accurate predictions about
the future—how shoppers decide between products, how terrorists operate, how diseases
spread.”); Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of
Personally Identifiable Information, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1852–53 (2011).
155 See MAYER-SCHO¨NBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 147, at 2.
156 See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 17.
157 See Thomas Hemnes, The Ownership and Exploitation of Personal Identity in the New
Media Age, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 17 (2012) (“One might think of a
person’s digital identity by analogy to a pointillist painting.  Thousands upon thousands of
tiny bits of digital information about an individual, including what we have called basic
facts, sensitive facts, and transactional facts, can be assembled to form a picture of the
individual: his likes, dislikes, predispositions, resources; and in fact, any facet of his person-
ality that has had contact with the Internet.”); Herb Weisbaum, Big Data Knows You’re Preg-
nant (and That’s Not All), CNBC (Apr. 9, 2014), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101566276
(“The World Privacy Forum estimates that there are now more than 4,000 databases col-
lecting and analyzing every bit of information they can gather on us.”).
158 See Lerman, supra note 154, at 57.
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B. What Does Big Data Know?
What information does “big data” collect about citizens (and thus
jurors) in America?  The answer: just about everything.  As Julia Angwin
termed it, “[w]e are living in a Dragnet Nation—a world of indiscriminate
tracking where institutions are stockpiling data about individuals at an
unprecedented pace.”159  This surveillance dragnet sucks in all forms of data
from all manner of sources.
Big data companies begin by collecting the same basic information pro-
vided to courts from voting rolls and driver’s licenses databases.160  This
information usually includes name, address, and date of birth.161  Other pub-
lic information (phone numbers, email addresses) and demographic infor-
mation (race, gender, age, ethnicity, religion, marital status, children,
education, occupation, and political affiliation) and governmentally col-
lected information (professional licenses, bankruptcies, criminal histories,
and public records) also form the core of many data profiles.162  Credit
reporting agencies such as Acxiom have been quite forthcoming about the
types of public or purchasable data that has become part of individual dos-
159 ANGWIN, supra note 146, at 3.
160 See id. at 33–34 (“To register to vote, citizens must fill out a government form that
usually requires their name, address, and in all but one state, birth date.  But few voters
realize that those lists are often sold to commercial data brokers.  A 2011 study found that a
statewide voter list sold for as little as $30 in California and as high as $6,050 in Geor-
gia. . . . State auto vehicle records are swept into LexisNexis reports, which are enhanced
with other data and sold to the Department of Homeland Security.”).
161 See id. at 33; see also Kline, supra note 152, at 448 (“Electronically available personal
data culled from public and private records forms the backbone of the multi-billion dollar
database-marketing industry.  Data brokers and their customers collect and trade massive
amounts of digitized personal data on most Americans through database-driven informa-
tion markets.  For example, ChoicePoint, self-described as the nation’s leading provider of
identification and credential verification services, maintains ‘14 billion records on individ-
uals and businesses that can be used for tasks like pre-employment screening of job candi-
dates.’” (footnotes omitted)).
162 See Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 457 (2008) (“There are information aggregation businesses in the
private sector that already combine personal data from thousands of private-sector sources
and public records.  ChoicePoint, Acxiom, LexisNexis, the three national credit bureaus,
and dozens of other companies maintain rich repositories of information about virtually
every adult in the country.  These records are updated daily by a steady stream of incoming
data.  They provide a one-stop-shop for the government when it wants access to personal
data, and most of the government’s data mining initiatives depend on access to those
data.”); Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI.
L. REV. 317, 320 (2008) (noting data collected includes “basic demographic information,
income, net worth, real property holdings, social security number, current and previous
addresses, phone numbers and fax numbers, names of neighbors, driver records, license
plate and VIN numbers, bankruptcy and debtor filings, employment, business and criminal
records, bank account balances and activity, stock purchases, and credit card activity”).
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siers created about identifiable citizens.163  Some companies boast about hav-
ing collected billions of data points on U.S. consumers.164
Companies supplement this basic information by collecting financial
and consumer data to develop precise pictures of individual and household
preferences.165  As Shaun Spencer has written,
 Everyday transactions, both online and in real space, convey a plethora of
data to third parties.  Our credit and debit card activity provides “a virtual
dossier of our daily activities.”  Merchants have access to our weekly grocery
orders, medical and prescription drug purchases, the books we buy, the mov-
ies we rent, and the causes to which we contribute.166
Transactional data not only reveals our lifestyle preferences, but can
reveal our location,167 our health,168 and how we think about certain
issues.169  The kind of car you drive might reveal an image you wish to pro-
ject.  The newspaper you read might reveal a political leaning.  Your choice
of television show, news channel, and home movie preference might reveal
your tastes.  Companies have recognized the wealth of information we pro-
vide through our purchases and have developed entire business strategies
around exploiting the predictive insights behind this information.170
163 See Shaun B. Spencer, The Surveillance Society and the Third-Party Privacy Problem, 65
S.C. L. REV. 373, 390–91 (2013); Letter from Jennifer Barrett Glasgow, Global Privacy &
Pub. Policy Exec., Acxiom Corp., to Rep. Edward Markey, U.S. House of Representatives
(Aug. 15, 2012), http://geekslop.com/main/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Acxiom_re
sponse_to_lawmakers.pdf.
164 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 17, at 46–47 (“Of the nine data brokers, one
data broker’s database has information on 1.4 billion consumer transactions and over 700
billion aggregated data elements; another data broker’s database covers one trillion dollars
in consumer transactions; and yet another data broker adds three billion new records each
month to its databases.”).
165 Strahilevitz, Privacy Law, supra note 19, at 2023 (“The genius of Big Data is that by
watching individuals’ purchasing, reading, and browsing habits, marketers can identify
their personality traits.”).
166 Spencer, supra note 163, at 391 (footnotes omitted) (in part quoting Stephen E.
Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State
Analogs to Protect Third Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373,
390 (2006)).
167 MANYIKA ET AL., supra note 1, at 85 (“Globally in 2008, there were 90 billion to 100
billion such transactions off line linkable to POS (‘point of sale’) devices.  Law enforce-
ment investigations regularly use such data to establish physical location.”).
168 Crawford & Schultz, supra note 149, at 97 (“[D]ata about our online behavior gen-
erally—such as buying an e-book about breast cancer survival or ‘liking’ a disease founda-
tion’s Facebook page—can also reveal information about our health.”).
169 See NICOLE A. OZER, ACLU OF N. CAL., DIGITAL BOOKS: A NEW CHAPTER FOR READER
PRIVACY 4–5 (2010); Neil M. Richards, The Perils of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 690–93
(2013).
170 See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html; Amy Lee,
What Your Personal Data Is Worth to Advertisers, HUFFINGTON POST (May 14, 2011), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/14/personal-dataadvertisers_n_861829.html; Natasha
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Beyond purchases, our digital lives, mediated through third-party plat-
forms, reveal our thoughts, fears, passions, and plans.171  Your Internet
searches reveal your concerns, curiosities, and hobbies.172  Mobile phone
GPS technology reveals your path in the world.173  Social media posts, con-
nections, and comments reveal your network of friends, contacts, opinions,
and activities, through both word and image.174  Any news stories or other
reports about you will be memorialized forever on the Internet.175
Big data, of course, is not without errors,176 oversimplifications,177 and
omissions (including the millions of people who are not connected to the
Internet or social media).178  Nor have these companies yet unified the per-
sonally identifiable data into one big database.  But, the technology exists to
target individuals at particular addresses, even though many of the tracking
technologies discussed do not track by name.179  By connecting other per-
Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/
technology/acxiom-the-quiet-giant-of-consumer-database-marketing.html.
171 See Nicolas P. Terry, Protecting Patient Privacy in the Age of Big Data, 81 UMKC L. REV.
385, 389–90 (2012) (“Increasingly and of considerable importance going forward, big data
comes from less structured sources including ‘[w]eb-browsing data trails, social network
communications, sensor data and surveillance data.’  Much of it is exhaust data, or data
created unintentionally as a byproduct of social networks, web searches, smartphones, and
other online behaviors.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lohr, supra note 1)).
172 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or “Do Not Track”: Advancing Trans-
parency and Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 281,
282 (2012) (“Every search, query, click, page view, and link are logged, retained, analyzed,
and used by a host of third parties, including websites (also known as ‘publishers’), adver-
tisers, and a multitude of advertising intermediaries, including ad networks, ad exchanges,
analytics providers, re-targeters, market researchers, and more.”).
173 See Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Google,
National Security and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 163 (2011)
(“Google and similar companies boast the ability to pinpoint a user’s exact location via
their Internet Protocol address or through cell phone triangulation, allowing users to
share this data with their friends.”).
174 See, e.g., Mitch Lipka, Twitter Is Selling Your Data, REUTERS (Mar. 1, 2012, 11:35 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/twitter-data-idUSL2E8DTEK420120301
(“Twitter users are about to become major marketing fodder, as two research companies
get set to release information to clients who will pay for the privilege of mining the data.”).
175 Strahilevitz, supra note 142, at 1670 (“One of the most significant developments in
the industrialized world during the last decade has been the increased availability of infor-
mation about individuals.  Personal information that was once obscure can be revealed
almost instantaneously via a Google search.”).
176 See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA.
L. REV. 327, 350 (2015).
177 As anyone who has received targeted advertisements for products not designed for
them knows, our Internet searches or purchases often do not reflect our preferences.
178 See Lerman, supra note 154, at 60.
179 See Elspeth A. Brotherton, Comment, Big Brother Gets a Makeover: Behavioral Targeting
and the Third-Party Doctrine, 61 EMORY L.J. 555, 562–63 (2012) (“An ad network can then
take the information it gathers through both individual content providers and tracking
cookies and compile everything it knows about a particular user into a personal ‘profile.’
These profiles are often quite comprehensive—so much so that they can personally iden-
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sonal identifying information, companies can easily reassemble disparate
pieces of information into one identifiable dossier.  In addition, household
segmentation—identifying parents, seniors, outdoors enthusiasts, book lov-
ers, or gambling addicts—can easily be accomplished with today’s
technology.180
The future promise of big data technology involves not only sophisti-
cated, real-time mapping of identifiable individuals (and their preferences)
at particular addresses, but the ability to make predictive judgments about
those people based on these preferences.181  These predictive assessments
tify individual Internet users.  This can occur even if the ad network technically does not
collect any ‘personally identifiable information’—information such as a ‘name, address,
telephone number, email address, financial account number, [and] government-issued
identifier’ that can be used ‘to identify, contact or precisely locate a person.’” (footnotes
omitted) (quoting Behavioral Advertising: Industry Practices and Consumers’ Expectations: Joint
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Prot. and the Subcomm. on
Commc’ns, Tech., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 111th Cong. 26
(2009) (statement of Edward W. Felten, Director, Center for Information Technology Pol-
icy, Princeton University)); Emily Steel, A Web Pioneer Profiles Users by Name, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 25, 2010, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230441050457
5560243259416072; Frequently Asked Questions, NETWORK ADVERTISING INITIATIVE, http://
www.networkadvertising.org/faq (last visited Dec. 18, 2015)).
180 See Maurice E. Stucke, Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of
Behavioral Economics, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 893, 952–53 (2010) (“One data collecting
company, Acxiom, reportedly has consumer data on more than 195 million Americans,
and employs, according to its website, ‘a household-level segmentation system that clusters
U.S. households into one of [seventy] segments within [twenty-one] life stage groups based
on specific consumer behavior and demographic characteristics,’ which includes ‘access to
critical information such as which competitors they shop, product usage, media prefer-
ences, attitudes toward advertising, interests and expenditures—both nationally and at a
local market level.’” (quoting Personicx Is a Consumer Segregation and Visualization System Pow-
ered by Acxioms’ Exclusive InfoBase Data, ACXIOM, http://personicx.aristotle.net/what_is/
default.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2015); PersonicX and Consumer Research Data Sources, ACX-
IOM, http://www.personicx.com/products/research/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 23,
2015))); see also Brotherton, supra note 179, at 562 (“[O]ne of the largest ad networks, a
company called RapLeaf, used segments such as ‘household income range, age range,
political leaning, and gender and age of children in the household, as well as interests in
topics including religion, the Bible, gambling, tobacco, adult entertainment and “get rich
quick” offers.’  In total, RapLeaf’s cookies segmented Internet users into over four hun-
dred categories.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Steel, supra note 179)); PAM DIXON & ROB-
ERT GELLMAN, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM, THE SCORING OF AMERICA: HOW SECRET CONSUMER
SCORES THREATEN YOUR PRIVACY AND YOUR FUTURE 33–38 (2014), http://www.worldpriva-
cyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/WPF_Scoring_of_America_April2014_fs.pdf.
181 See PERSIS YU & JILLIAN MCLAUGHLIN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., BIG DATA: A BIG
DISAPPOINTMENT FOR SCORING CONSUMER CREDIT RISK 11 (rev. Mar. 14, 2014), http://www
.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-big-data.pdf (“A rich portrait of individuals
emerges from the ability to track their online behavior.  From purchase histories to search
topics, a completely unedited and unmediated version of a person emerges.  This data is
incredibly valuable to marketers and there are few restrictions on such data in the U.S.
This data can be bought and sold at will.”).
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might involve static judgments about credit risk182 or more fluid guesses
about what movie you will see on Saturday night.183  While advertising com-
panies have been the dominant, early adopters of the technology, the data is
also incredibly valuable for more civic-minded goals, such as getting out the
vote.184
In fact, both major political parties have mapped the location and politi-
cal and cultural preferences of potential voters in an effort to identify and
target those sympathetic to their cause.185  Political consultants and national
political parties claim to have collected data on “every one of the 168 million
or so registered voters in the country, cross-indexed with phone numbers,
addresses, voting history, income range, and so on—up to as many as several
hundred points of data on each voter.”186  These profiles involve demo-
graphic and personal segmentation based on predictive assessments about
the individual voters.187  The profiles are specific and current, describing
individual persons, and representing voters living in a particular jurisdiction
182 See Strahilevitz, Privacy Law, supra note 19, at 2021 (“[A] credit card issuer deter-
mined that individuals who have purchased felt pads to be placed on the bottoms of chairs
to prevent the scratching of hardwood floors turn out to be excellent credit risks.”); id. at
2023 (“The person who purchases felt pads is likely to be more conscientious and may have
a lower discount rate than a nonpurchaser.  It is not surprising that this set of attributes
would correlate well with credit-worthiness.”); Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-Card
Company Know About You?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/
2009/05/17/magazine/17credit-t.html.
183 Richard Warner & Robert H. Sloan, Behavioral Advertising: From One-Sided Chicken to
Informational Norms, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 49, 52 (2012) (“Advertisers can determine
where you work, how and with whom you spend your time, and ‘[w]ith 87% certainty . . .
where you’ll be next Thursday at 5:35 p.m.’” (quoting Lucas Mearian, Big Data to Drive a
Surveillance Society, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 24, 2011, 2:23 PM), http://www.computerworld
.com/s/article/9215033/Big_data_to_drive_a_surveillance_ society)).
184 See ANGWIN, supra note 146, at 33 (“Commercial data brokers combine the voting
information with other data to create rich profiles of individuals.  For instance, the data
broker Aristotle Inc. markets its ability to identify 190 million voters by more than ‘500
consumer data points’ such as their credit rating and size of their mortgage.”); see also id.
(Aristotle’s data allows purchasers to know “whether they [voters] subscribe to religious
magazines, or if they have a hunting license.”).
185 See, e.g., Sasha Issenberg, Obama’s White Whale, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2012, 11:28 AM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/victory_lab/2012/02/project_narwhal_
how_a_top_secret_obama_campaign_program_could_change_the_2012_race_.html; Ter-
rence McCoy, The Creepiness Factor: How Obama and Romney Are Getting to Know You, ATLAN-
TIC (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-creepi
ness-factor-how-obama-and-romney-aregetting-to-know-you/255499/.
186 Jon Gertner, The Very, Very Personal Is the Political, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 15, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/15/magazine/the-very-very-personal-is-the-political
.html.
187 See Michael S. Kang, From Broadcasting to Narrowcasting: The Emerging Challenge for
Campaign Finance Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1070, 1079 (2005) (describing micro-target-
ing involving “the libertarian white male in Cobb County, Georgia, who would swing their
way if approached appropriately,” or “the socially conservative African American on the
South Side of Chicago who might vote for a Republican”); Ira S. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in
the Age of Big Data, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 861, 876–83.
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at a particular time.  The rise of political microtargeting has demonstrated
that big data can impact the outcomes of elections.188
Obviously, courts looking to create a data driven jury selection system
would benefit from access to this same information, which likely includes
most potential jurors.189
C. Bright Data and Jury Selection
Like politicians who have begun to see the value in collecting voter data,
courts and litigants may begin to see the potential benefit in collecting juror
data now available through big data systems.  This Section looks at whether
the information being collected by big data companies might assist courts in
assembling juries that meet constitutional and statutory requirements.  Obvi-
ously, not all of the personal data collected by such companies would be
shared with the courts: health information, internet search queries, private
purchases, or embarrassing proclivities would naturally not be shared.  None-
theless, big data could provide a far more robust picture of jurors beyond
race, gender, age, zip code, and occupation.  Second, this Section looks at
whether bright data would serve the interests of the litigants at trial.  As may
be obvious, most trial lawyers would like as much information as possible
about potential jurors, leading to the conclusion that bright data is an attrac-
tive innovation for parties picking a jury.
1. Court Systems and Bright Data
As set forth in Part I, courts have several important interests to promote
in jury selection: (1) courts must ensure a fair cross-section of jurors through
random selection;190 (2) judges must prevent use of peremptory strikes
based on impermissible discriminatory motives;191 (3) court administrators
must improve juror yields;192 and (4) courts must promote a system of justice
188 See Rubinstein, supra note 187, at 883–85 (discussing microtargeting); Michael
Scherer, Inside the Secret World of the Data Crunchers Who Helped Obama Win, TIME (Nov. 7,
2012), http://swampland.time.com/2012/11/07/inside-the-secret-world-of-quants-and-
data-crunchers-who-helped-obama-win/; Mike Allen & Kenneth P. Vogel, Inside the Koch
Data Mine, POLITICO (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/12/koch-broth-
ers-rnc-113359.html#ixzz3NJNxqsHU (“The Koch brothers and their allies are pumping
tens of millions of dollars into a data company that’s developing detailed, state-of-the-art
profiles of 250 million Americans, giving the brothers’ political operation all the earmarks
of a national party.”).
189 See Charles Duhigg, Campaigns Mine Personal Lives to Get Out Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/us/politics/campaigns-mine-personal-
lives-to-get-out-vote.html; Thomas B. Edsall, Let the Nanotargeting Begin, N.Y. TIMES CAM-
PAIGN STOPS (Apr. 15, 2012, 10:39 PM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/
04/15/let-the-nanotargeting-begin/; Robert L. Mitchell, Campaign 2012: Mining For Voters,
COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 29, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/
9232567/Campaign_2012_Mining_for_voters.
190 See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979).
191 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986).
192 See Nelson, supra note 135 (discussing jury yields).
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that minimizes disparities of wealth and ensures a fair legal process.  As set
forth below, bright data systems have the potential to improve each of these
areas of concern.  Precisely because big data technologies remedy the infor-
mational limitations of the current jury system, they offer a new and poten-
tially better way to think about jury selection.
a. Bright Data and the Fair Cross-Section Requirement
Courts currently compile jury lists using the limited information con-
tained in voting lists, driver’s license lists, or other governmental records.193
Jury administrators then randomly choose juror names, in an effort to main-
tain compliance with the Jury Selection Act, and to achieve the level of diver-
sity needed to satisfy the fair cross-section requirement.194  Bright data
includes that basic information, but also adds additional levels of individual
or segmented data, which could all be randomized to increase diversity in
selection.
Putting aside the normative judgment about whether adopting a bright
data jury selection system would be a good idea,195 as a technical matter, a
jury venire that matches the exact demographic patterns in a community can
be created.  First, an accurate demographic survey could be agreed upon as a
benchmark, either from governmental census sources or big data analytics.
Then, a bright data system could take all of the identifying information from
voter lists, and add the other available information.  From there, the court
could create a jury list with almost perfect levels of representative diversity.
As an initial matter, one could ensure that each jury group included equal
numbers of individuals in “distinctive groups,” the equivalent of current prac-
tice.196  Bright data, however, would allow for creation of a randomized fair
cross-section not only as measured by race, ethnicity, and gender, but also
include age, interests, political affiliations, or net worth (or really any other
criteria).  Random selection could still create this different order of diversity
(just within segmented groups), and could still meet the requirement of pro-
ducing a fair cross-section.
Again, as a technical matter (rather than a legal or normative matter),
such a process could be accomplished with existing technology.  In the same
way that a particular company might want to promote its new magazine to
young, working-class, lesbian homeowners, a company (contracted by the
courts) could send a jury summons that would ensure that the pool met per-
sonal and demographic requirements.  Primarily, the task involves appropri-
ate coding of individuals or groups (identified by mailing address) and an
algorithm that can determine the appropriate percentage of the relevant
group in a community.
193 See supra text accompanying notes 63–67.
194 See supra text accompanying note 79.
195 See Part III below for a discussion of whether such bright data innovations are
worth adopting.
196 See supra text accompanying notes 12–14 (discussing “distinctive groups”).
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Such a smart jury selection process might avoid future cross-section chal-
lenges because the court could assure an almost exactly demographically rep-
resentative jury pool.  In addition, if it could be shown that there still existed
a racial or ethnic disparity because of a limited pool of available jurors, the
courts could address the problem by modifying the selection algorithm.
Such a change would transform the search for a fair cross-section into a
proactive problem-solving exercise, rather than a defensive litigation
response.
Bright data technologies could achieve a fully diverse cross-section of the
population, increase diversity in the jury venire, and reduce constitutional
challenges.  While other practical, legal, and moral concerns might ulti-
mately dissuade courts from adopting the practice, the technical ability to
create a big data jury exists.
b. Bright Data and Unconstitutional Peremptory Strikes
Beyond the venire, the unconstitutional use of peremptory strikes con-
tinues to undermine the promise of Batson.  Bright data offers a potential
solution.  Litigants could be provided an accurate, composite picture of each
juror rather than just guessing from the rough proxies of race, ethnicity, and
gender.  Litigants would know actual juror preferences rather than stereo-
types.  Litigants would evaluate the whole person, instead of relying on a
rather un-illuminating stereotype.  In addition, because of available informa-
tion on the Internet and social media, litigants might even be clued into the
potential jurors’ actual views about certain matters.197
This increased access to information might well result in more nuanced,
and less race-based or gender-based peremptory strikes.198  Of course, liti-
gants could still use these targeted categories as proxies.  Striking a woman
from the jury panel because she is a woman, and striking a woman because
she reads fashion magazines leads to the same result—fewer women on the
jury.199  While real questions remain about whether more information will
simply provide better excuses to strike people for the same unconstitutional
reason, more information should save certain jurors from strikes, and pro-
197 See Eric P. Robinson, Virtual Voir Dire: The Law and Ethics of Investigating Jurors Online,
36 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 597, 599–600 (2013) (“Jurors’ online presence—their online
profiles, blog posts, Twitter messages, and online comments—as well as the other informa-
tion available about jurors online can be a ‘treasure trove of information about poten-
tial . . . jurors’ during voir dire and trial.  Now, instead of relying on stereotypes and
intuition to vet jurors during voir dire, litigators may use the vast resources available online
to find information about potential jurors that is unlikely to come out during the usual voir
dire process.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Julie Kay, Social Networking Sites Help Vet Jurors,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=1202423725315?back=law)).
198 Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 613–14, 634 (“Attorneys with more information about
potential jurors are less likely to strike a juror solely because of gender or race, which are
both unconstitutional.”).
199 See, e.g., Demographics—Audience, ELLE MEDIA KIT http://www.ellemediakit.com/r5/
showkiosk.asp?listing_id=4165173 (last visited Oct. 28, 2015) (reporting women comprise
roughly 92% of Elle’s readership).
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vide reasons for striking others that do not involve race or gender.  In addi-
tion, as race and gender identities become more complex with ethnically
mixed families and fluid gender lines, this deeper information will allow for
equally complex decision making.200
c. Bright Data and Jury Yield
Jury yields remain unacceptably low.201  Jurors fail to respond to their
summons for very basic reasons.  Some never receive the summons because
of outdated addresses.  Some fail to understand the summons.  Some have
health or work conflicts.  Some simply ignore it.  Courts have begun tracking
individuals who do not appear for jury duty, but not with the sophisticated
real-time data that bright data systems can provide.202
Bright data can provide three improvements to the current system.  First,
it could correct many outdated address excuses.  Courts estimate that
between 6% and 15% of jury no-shows never receive the summons at the
correct address.203  As anyone who has recently moved houses knows, real-
tors, contractors, and others immediately begin contacting the new
residents.204  This data comes from post office change of address informa-
tion, as well as publicly available real estate records.205  If courts began rely-
ing on bright data systems, they would know of the move as soon as the
change of address or new homeowners’ insurance policy was signed.
Second, the real success of big data is targeted marketing.  Currently,
courts send jury summons in the same way to all potential jurors: a mailed
card sent by the United States Postal Service.206  Such a method may be nec-
essary, but can certainly be supplemented.  Using all of the innovations of
200 See Susan Saluny, Census Data Presents Rise in Multiracial Population of Youths, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25race.html (“Among
American children, the multiracial population has increased almost 50 percent, to 4.2 mil-
lion, since 2000, making it the fastest growing youth group in the country.”).
201 See Nelson, supra note 135.
202 But see MIZE ET AL., supra note 42, at 22 (“With respect to undeliverable summonses,
for example, many courts have borrowed techniques from commercial mail-order compa-
nies such as contracting with National-Change-of Address (NCOA) vendors to provide
updated addresses for people who have moved since the master jury list was compiled.”).
203 Id.
204 See Adam Tanner, How the Post Office Sells Your Address Update to Anyone Who Pays (And
the Little-Known Loophole to Opt Out), FORBES (July 8, 2013, 12:11 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/adamtanner/2013/07/08/how-the-post-office-sells-your-new-address-with-any-
one-who-pays-and-the-little-known-loophole-to-opt-out/.
205 Id.
206 See Hannaford-Agor, supra note 60, at 782 (“Nationally, an average of 12% of jury
summonses are returned by the United States Postal Service marked ‘undeliverable,’ which
is the single biggest factor contributing to decreased jury yields.  Some undeliverable sum-
monses are due to inaccurate addresses, but the vast majority are simply out-of-date
because the person has moved to a new residence.  Nationally, an estimated 12% of the
nation’s population moved to a new address each year.  Thus, even if a court could begin
the year with a completely accurate master jury list, by the end of the year, one out of every
eight records would be outdated.” (footnotes omitted)).
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targeted marketing, and all of the connected sources of information, courts
using bright data could try different methods to get the same jurors to show
up.  Internet banner ads could be used to remind jurors about their upcom-
ing service.  Social media, email, and even texts could be used to remind
jurors about jury duty.  Some studies show that many juror no-shows are the
result of forgetting about the summons, and these direct reminders would
make it difficult to forget about the jury date.
Third, for those jurors without a mistaken address excuse, the court will
now be able to determine who the scofflaws are, and maybe even look at
other correlating data.  For example, studies show that many lower-income,
minimum wage workers fail to show up for jury duty because of the economic
cost of doing so.207  Bright data systems would be able to demonstrate
whether this relationship holds, or whether there are other types of correla-
tions that might better explain the absence.  Juror no-shows could be coded,
studied, and identified to attempt to discover the underlying problems.
d. Bright Data and Distributional Justice
Courts promote the concept of equal justice under law.208  Inequality in
financial resources, however, has made that promise a hollow one for many
litigants.  The fact that some litigants can hire jury consultants to obtain a
tactical advantage over others has always been an example of a distributional
inequity of the system.209  Bright data can change that by providing court
approved bright data profiles (again appropriately moderated) to all liti-
gants.  If the information is already being collected for purposes of the jury
venire, then court systems can make it available for the parties in trial.
As will be discussed in the next Section, this personal information about
potential jurors will be incredibly helpful for litigants trying to pick a
favorable jury.
2. Litigants and Bright Data
Bright data offers great advantage to litigants for the simple reason that
most lawyers would like as much information about potential jurors as possi-
ble.210  As a tactical matter, lawyers seek any available advantage, and, some-
207 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 70, at 356; King, supra note 13, at 715.
208 The phrase is inscribed on the fac¸ade of the United States Supreme Court.
209 See Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Trial Survive Google?, 25 CRIM. JUST. 4, 9
(2011) (“Background checks on jurors are becoming commonplace, particularly in high-
profile or violent crime cases. . . . Some lawyers are coming to jury selection armed with a
phalanx of paralegals to run each juror’s name through a variety of social media searches
in real time.”).
210 See United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“[W]hen it
comes to prying into matters personal to a juror, the interests of counsel on either side of
the aisle are not necessarily antagonistic.  All the lawyers want to learn just about all they
can about the prospective jurors.”).
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times, knowledge is power when it comes to voir dire.211  Whether or not
more data equates to better juror selection, more information about inter-
ests, inclinations, and past acts will result in more informed jury selection.
As set out above, the information held by big data companies can expose
attributes about ourselves that we may not even acknowledge.  While imper-
fect in many ways, the clues about our interests and past do hold some value
in deciding how we might view a particular legal case.  The data available may
well be superior to traditional oral questioning in voir dire, or formal ques-
tionnaires, because it avoids embarrassing admissions or self-censorship.212
Implicit biases and explicit biases might be revealed without having to ask a
direct question.213  Further, litigants can use the information to ask follow up
questions, test veracity of answers, and sort jurors in a more efficient manner.
D. The Availability of Bright Data
Big data information systems exist and are collecting and analyzing per-
sonal data which could be made available to courts.  Big data companies
already possess all the information that courts use for jury summons, as these
public databases (DMV lists, voter lists) form the core of the information
generated about individuals.214  In addition, these companies already contact
the same individuals for other reasons.  Adding the specific task of coordinat-
ing jury summons with existing information is well within existing capabili-
ties.  Big data companies thus may see a financial incentive in partnering with
court systems that could hire them to select jurors.215
While the cost of contracting with big data companies is unknown,
courts may find the arrangement actually results in a cost saving for them.
Currently, courts must hire, support, and fund entire juror offices to coordi-
nate the thousands of citizens arriving for jury duty.  Outsourcing the selec-
tion to big data firms might save both personnel costs and technology costs.
Further, a more targeted system will avoid waste in terms of over-summonsing
jurors because of high juror no-show rates.  Courts may thus have an incen-
tive to outsource this service to a cheaper, more efficient, and arguably more
effective mechanism for summoning jurors.
If courts do adopt such a big data inspired system, they would need to
answer a few practical questions.  First, do courts want to address the tradi-
tional fair cross-section problem?  If jury venires do not represent the existing
211 See, e.g., Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 545, 553 (1975).
212 See Melanie D. Wilson, Juror Privacy in the Sixth Amendment Balance, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 2023, 2027 (noting that it is well understood that “[f]orcing jurors to respond to
personal questions intensifies the pressure on jurors to lie and to withhold material facts,
making it more likely that biased jurors will survive voir dire”).
213 See Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the
Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 139, 141 (2010).
214 See supra Section II.A.
215 To be clear, this financial relationship has not yet developed, but as data becomes a
commodity, courts will hold significant amounts of valuable personal information.
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population in terms of race or ethnicity, should courts attempt to summon a
perfectly representative jury?  Would doing so require altering algorithms to
correct for expected juror no-shows?  Would this targeting necessarily over-
burden members of minority groups who might be summoned at a dispro-
portionate frequency?216
Courts would also need to decide whether they wish to go beyond tradi-
tional diversity.  With big data metrics, the choices of which categories are
really quite open.  One could program the summons-generating algorithm to
target age, income, political affiliation, sexual orientation, religion, other
demographic characteristics, etc.  In particularly complex or technical cases,
one even could select for a certain level of technical knowledge.  Individual
jurisdictions would have to consider such decisions, but, as a technical mat-
ter, the additional measures of diversity are nearly unlimited.
Depending on the categories chosen about jurors, courts will also need
to decide what type of information they will share with the litigants.  Big data
dossiers include far more personal information than need to be shared with
the parties.  Health information, Internet search queries, reading lists, and
other areas should be off-limits (or not collected by the courts).  As will be
discussed in Part III, real privacy issues exist and must be addressed.
In addition to what information, courts must determine when they will
provide the information to parties.217  Obviously, courts know which individ-
ual jurors are scheduled to show up to court several weeks or months in the
future.  This timeframe provides ample opportunity to collect information
on the jurors.  However, in the ordinary course of trial, the court does not
know which courtroom (or to which case) a juror will be assigned until the
day of service.218  As it makes little sense to reveal personal juror information
to lawyers who do not need that information, courts will need to create a
system to provide that information at the correct time, and to the correct
courtroom.  Plainly, courts already share juror lists with parties, but with big
data there will be more information to share.  Providing the parties with such
a list with enough time to prepare might make the actual jury selection much
more efficient, at least in large civil trials or death penalty cases with numer-
ous summoned jurors.219
216 For example, would someone of a particular minority group be summoned at a rate
higher than members of a majority group in order to match the proportion of the
population?
217 Providing the information too late to be useful would undermine the effectiveness
of the innovation.
218 Jury pools are usually selected on the day needed, and it is difficult to predict which
jurors will end up in which courtroom.
219 See Martha Neil, Pretrial Searches of Jurors’ Social Media Could Prevent Mistrials, Judges
Suggest, AM. BAR ASSOC. J. (July 9, 2014, 6:40 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/arti-
cle/cut_lawyer_use_of_gotcha_card_by_requiring_online_searches_of_jurors_backgr
(“Instead of waiting until after a verdict is rendered to look into the background of jurors
selected to hear the case, suggests Circuit Judge Anthony Rondolino, lawyers in complex
litigation could be given time at the outset and encouraged to perform social media
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Finally, courts will need to make a decision of what to do with the infor-
mation once the juror has been excused from service.220  While one easy
solution would be to purge the information, or anonymize it, the possibility
of future study may tempt courts to keep the information.  As big data com-
panies know, data can be a valuable commodity.221  If courts began studying
juror composition, jury verdicts, and cases, very interesting (and potentially
valuable) correlations could be generated.
These practical questions pale in comparison to the difficult theoretical
questions that arise from big data technologies’ ability to offer the tempting
possibility of precision jury selection.  The next Part addresses these funda-
mental questions about whether courts should adopt big data in their jury
selection systems.
III. THE BIG DATA DILEMMA
New data technologies present a dilemma for courts.  The informational
gaps in jury selection are real and unsolved.  Big data offers innovative solu-
tions to improve at least some portion of these problems.  Yet, as with the use
of many new technologies, real risks exist.  The dilemma, in fact, strikes at
the very core of the jury system—why we have it, what it symbolizes, and how
courts should respond to new technological advances.
This Part explores five fundamental questions that courts must answer
before considering the use of bright data in jury selection.  First, even if
bright data could provide a perfectly representative jury venire, would search-
ing for a diverse jury pool change the role of the jury in society?  Second, how
would the invasion of privacy that results from using big data technologies
affect juror participation in the jury system?  Third, should courts, as govern-
mental institutions, be in the business of collecting vast troves of personal
information about potential jurors, and, if so, what are the risks involved?
Fourth, would access to additional personal information about potential
jurors reduce unconstitutional peremptory challenges based on racial or gen-
der stereotypes or would it create more sophisticated pretextual strikes?
Finally, would the affirmative use of racial or gender considerations in selec-
searches on jurors right then, so any objections about lack of disclosure could be raised
before trial.”).
220 See Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L.
TECH. & POL’Y 281, 321 (proposing data retention policies); Christopher Soghoian, An End
to Privacy Theater: Exposing and Discouraging Corporate Disclosure of User Data to the Government,
12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 191, 209–10 (2011) (“[M]ost technology providers and commu-
nications carriers now have established data retention policies that govern the length of
time before which they will delete customer records, communications, logs, and other
data.”); John A. Stratford, Comment, Adventures on the Autobahn and Infobahn: United States
v. Jones, Mandatory Data Retention, and a More Reasonable “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy”,
103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985, 991 (2013) (discussing the lack of government data
retention policies).
221 In fact, the data about jurors and their actions in jury verdicts would be quite valua-
ble to companies regularly involved in lawsuits.
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tion systems run afoul of existing equal protection rules prohibiting consider-
ation of race or gender in selection systems?
These big questions of role, privacy, power, pretext, and discrimination
involve longstanding, contested issues.  Each will be addressed in turn.
A. The Question of Jury Role
Perhaps the most fundamental question presented by the big data
dilemma is what does society want the jury to be?  Sorting technology might
allow us to have a fully representative jury, algorithmically designed to
represent not only the racial and gender makeup of a community, but pro-
portionately represent the community’s political affiliation, employment,
income, and personal interests, etc.  However, this algorithmic accuracy only
matters if the goal of the jury venire is to create a truly representative cross-
section as opposed to a fair cross-section.  If the jury instead serves some
other role, then this technological innovation may be unnecessary.
The question of the jury role has been well-considered and oft-contested
since the Founding.222  Depending on how one views the jury’s role—as a
fact finder, a check on government, a representative democratic institution, a
moral conscience, or a space of civic education—the answer to whether
bright data technologies assist or hinder the jury’s role(s) may vary.  This
Section examines the competing visions of the jury as impacted by the possi-
bility of bright data technologies.  Each potential role of the jury will be
briefly set forth with a broader discussion of bright data’s impact to follow.
1. Existing Tensions in the Role of the Jury
In a purely instrumental role, the jury finds facts and applies the law to
facts.223  Jury instructions articulate this role as “fact-finder.”224  Courts
repeat it daily.  Jurors swear an oath to abide by it.  Theoretically, jurors
begin impartial, detached, and neutral—a tabula rasa of unformed judg-
ment.225  This vision has the benefit of emphasizing the importance of
222 See Ferguson, supra note 53, at 1115–35.
223 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (“[T]he jury’s constitutional
responsibility is not merely to determine the facts, but to apply the law to those facts and
draw the ultimate conclusion of guilt or innocence.”); Chris Kemmitt, Function over Form:
Reviving the Criminal Jury’s Historical Role as a Sentencing Body, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 93,
112 (2006) (“The party line typically hewn to by modern American courts is that the jury
exists merely to find facts: juries make factual determinations and judges sentence, end of
story.”).
224 Ferguson, supra note 53, at 1142.
225 See, e.g., Joan L. Larsen, Ancient Juries and Modern Judges: Originalism’s Uneasy Relation-
ship with the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 959, 966 (2010) (“The idealized modern jury thus acts as
a blank slate upon which litigants may sketch their versions of the facts.  The facts are the
focus because today’s ideal jurors are finders of fact only.”); Michael B. Mushlin, Bound and
Gagged: The Particular Predicament of Professional Jurors, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 239, 241
(2007) (“[T]he traditional view of the juror’s role throughout trial is that of an empty
vessel into which information presented in the form of exhibits, testimony, argument, and
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impartiality defined as being fair and open-minded.226  Of course, such a
conception of the jury may not reflect reality, as numerous studies show that
jurors retain their explicit and implicit biases when they arrive for jury ser-
vice.227  Jurors are not blank slates, but fully inscribed chalkboards filled with
all sorts of preconceived notions that affect their judgments about witnesses,
facts, scientific evidence, and ultimately their final verdicts.228  Yet, the court
system generally ignores this reality, choosing to see jurors as neutral, passive
arbiters personally removed from the case.229  Diverse perspectives are wel-
comed but not required, leaving some commentators to question whether
certain viewpoints ever make it to the jury room.230  Courts seem willing to
trust juries, instructed by the judge on the law, to act within a narrowly
defined, functional role, deciding the facts as they come into evidence.231
Such a narrow, task-oriented image does not delimit the role of the
jury.232  Some commentators see the jury as part of the broader constitu-
tional structure, checking governmental and prosecutorial power.233  The
Supreme Court has acknowledged this function.234  As Justice Antonin Scalia
stated, “[The right to a jury trial] is no mere procedural formality, but a
judicial instructions will be poured.” (quoting NANCY S. MARDER, THE JURY PROCESS 105
(2005))); Sarah N. Conde, Note, Capote in the Jury Box: Analyzing the Ethics of Jurors Writing
Books, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 643, 646 (2006) (“Protected by the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments, the right to trial by jury is based on an ideal of impartiality, which draws on
an assumption that jurors appear with a ‘blank slate, neutral, and untainted by experience
or publicity.’” (quoting SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY
ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 6 (1988))).
226 See Steven I. Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85
NW. U. L. REV. 190, 195 (1990) (“This perception of fairness is as important to the pro-
ceedings as is actual fairness.  A system perceived as inaccurate undermines the public’s
confidence in the jury to reach fair—and accurate—results.”); Smith, supra note 78, at 431
(“One feature of the American jury that was deemed important was its impartiality.”).
227 E.g., Roberts, supra note 116, at 833.
228 See B. Michael Dann, “Learning Lessons” and “Speaking Rights”: Creating Educated and
Democratic Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229, 1242 (1993).
229 See Friedland, supra note 226, at 198 (“Under this dominant model of the American
jury, jurors are expected to silently examine and listen carefully to all of the evidence, and
then to evaluate that evidence during the deliberation phase of the trial.  During the evi-
dentiary phase of the trial, in particular, jurors are expected to be passive observers.”).
230 See Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261
(2000).
231 See Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994) (“The jury’s function is to
find the facts and to decide whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged.”).
232 See Ferguson, supra note 53, at 1116–36.
233 See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, The People’s Peremptory Challenge and Batson: Aiding the
People’s Voice and Vision Through the “Representative” Jury, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1675, 1678 (2012)
(“The jury acts as the People’s eyes by monitoring the state and its agents.  That monitor-
ing reveals abuses of power, discourages those abuses, and humbles our leaders and their
agents.”).
234 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155–56 (1968) (detailing how juries protect
against arbitrary prosecutions).
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fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure.  Just as suf-
frage ensures the people’s ultimate control in the legislative and executive
branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control in the judiciary.”235  This
understanding—that the jury serves as a structural check on power—has
deep roots in our constitutional history.236
Related to this structural role, the jury also serves as the voice of the
people in administering justice.237  This democratic vision has two compo-
nents—a participatory role and a legitimizing role.  First, the jury requires
citizens to act as citizens.238  Like voting and serving as a public official, jury
service allows ordinary citizens to participate in the working of a democratic
government.239  As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in Powers v. Ohio, “The
235 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305–06 (2004); see also Jenny E. Carroll, Nullifi-
cation as Law, 102 GEO. L.J. 579 (2014) [hereinafter Carroll, Nullification]; Jenny E. Carroll,
The Jury’s Second Coming, 100 GEO. L.J. 657, 685 (2012) [hereinafter Carroll, Second
Coming].
236 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Making the Framers’ Case, and a Modern Case, for Jury
Involvement in Habeas Adjudication, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 887, 892 (2010) (“The Framers
regarded jury rights as a critical component of the Constitution’s checks-and-balances pro-
tection of individual freedom against potential excesses of other governmental actors: on
both federal and state levels, the jury was to ensure that legislatures, prosecutors, and
judges could not conspire to convict and harshly punish politically unpopular defend-
ants.”); Kemmitt, supra note 223, at 105 (“John Taylor of Caroline, a leading constitutional
theorist of the early Republic, likened the jury to the ‘lower judicial bench’ in a bicameral
judiciary.  The Maryland Farmer echoed Taylor, describing the jury as ‘the democratic
branch of the judiciary power,’ and the anti-Federalist John Hampden extended the meta-
phor, explaining that trial by jury was ‘the democratical balance in the Judicary power.’”
(footnotes omitted)).
237 See Taslitz, supra note 233, at 1677 (“[T]he jury ‘represents’ the People by acting for
the good of the People as a whole in performing tasks that all the members of the People
could not themselves collectively perform.  It is not the content of any particular jury ver-
dict—guilty or not guilty—that matters but the very process of jury observation and delib-
eration that itself brings about political benefits on behalf of all the People.”).
238 See Amar, supra note 56, at 218 (“Jury service was understood at the time of the
founding by leaders on all sides of the ratification debate as one of the fundamental pre-
requisites to majoritarian self-government.”); Berman, supra note 236, at 891 (“Indeed, the
criminal jury process was seen by the Framers as a community responsibility as much as a
right: through jury service, citizens would have not just an opportunity, but an obligation,
to participate directly in the actual administration of government.”).
239 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the democratic
element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance
of the laws by all of the people.  It ‘affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to
participate in a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, a respect for
law.’  Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury
duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the democratic process.” (inter-
nal citations and quotations omitted)); Amar, supra note 56, at 206 (“The argument of this
Article is that the link between jury service and other rights of political participation such
as voting is an important part of our overall constitutional structure, spanning three centu-
ries and eight amendments: the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth,
Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth.  As we shall see, the voting-jury service linkage was recog-
nized by the Framers in the 1780s, by those responsible for drafting the reconstruction
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opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the administration of jus-
tice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retain-
ing the jury system.”240  “We the people” must participate in our own legal
system.241
The democratic nature of jury service also legitimizes jury verdicts.242  A
judgment of a jury of one’s peers carries more authority than the conclusion
of a single judge.243  If the jury is seen to fairly represent community interests
and sentiments, this verdict not only reaffirms the legal system, but the larger
democratic system.244  People perceive diverse juries as being more
legitimate.245
Jury verdicts possess not only legal legitimacy but moral legitimacy.246
While jurors no longer decide the law, as they once did at the time of the
nation’s Founding,247 jurors do still reflect the community conscience, pro-
amendments and implementing legislation, and still later by authors of twentieth century
amendments that protect various groups against discrimination in voting.  Moreover, each
of the groups the Supreme Court has already determined should be protected against
discrimination in jury service is also protected by one of the voting discrimination
amendments.”).
240 Powers, 499 U.S. at 406; see also id. at 402 (“Jury service is an exercise of responsible
citizenship by all members of the community, including those who otherwise might not
have the opportunity to contribute to our civic life.”).
241 See ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY JURY DUTY MATTERS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION (2013); Robert Mark Savage, Where Subjects Were Citizens: The
Emergence of a Republican Language and Polity in Colonial American Law Court Culture,
1750–1776 4 (2011) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Columbia University), http://academic-
commons.columbia.edu/catalog/ac:131400 (“Americans believed their juries to possess,
inherently, a republican character.  Juries continued to embody the voices of ‘the people,’
broadly speaking, within the machinery of the state.  This republican character of the
American jury held such attraction that, by the 1830s, the power of the jury had already
become enshrined in national memory as both a political weapon and as a means of com-
munity coherence, as well as a potent symbol of liberty itself.”).
242 See, e.g., Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV. 311,
346–49 (2003).
243 See Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 518–19 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“A jury
verdict expresses a collective judgment that we may fairly presume to reflect the considered
view of the community.”).
244 Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons from Civil Jury Trials,
40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 728 (1991) (“Lay participation in debates concerning public policies
is a touchstone of a democracy.  The Constitution enshrines this value not only by provid-
ing for a system of elected representatives, but also by recognizing the right to trial by
jury.”).
245 See, e.g., Ellis & Diamond, supra note 36, at 1033; King, supra note 36, at 1182–86. R
246 See Carroll, Nullification, supra note 235; Carroll, Second Coming, supra note 235, at
685–87.
247 Tabatha Abu El-Haj, Changing the People: Legal Regulation and American Democracy, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 57 (2011) (“During the first decades of the nineteenth century, the jury
maintained its right to decide questions of law.”); Robert P. Burns, The Dignity, Rights, and
Responsibilities of the Jury: On the Structure of Normative Argument, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1147, 1154
(2011) (“During the founding period, the jury was widely understood to embody the popu-
lar sovereignty that was distinctive to American political theory.  It was understood as well
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viding accountable, public, and occasionally merciful judgments in particular
cases.248  By nature of how they are constituted, juries reflect local view-
points.249  Some communities view certain crimes differently than others,
and reflect those values through criminal acquittals or large civil jury
verdicts.250
Finally, as I have written elsewhere, the jury has long been a place of
civic education.251  Jury service necessitates exposure to substantive legal con-
cepts, practical observation of the court system, and practice of the skills nec-
to be the sole institution in which the people’s sovereignty survived the enactment of the
written constitution.  Many authors and lawyers in the founding period insisted that the
jury was thus to be the judge ‘both of fact and law.’  The view was that the jury’s responsibil-
ity to render a just verdict in a particular case both expressed its unique dignity and implied
that it must, as a reflection of its responsibility, pass judgment on the morality of the written
law.”).
248 Nancy S. Marder, Deliberations and Disclosures: A Study of Post-Verdict Interviews of Jurors,
82 IOWA L. REV. 465, 472 (1997) (“The view of the jury as a single entity that speaks
through its verdict has symbolic value because the jury speaks not only for itself, but also
for the community.  The community has assigned the jury the task of reaching a judgment
on its behalf.  The jury, then, serves an important function in our public rituals.  The com-
munity, faced with disputes that are extremely difficult to resolve, has decided that it will
give such decisions to a jury drawn from the community.”).
249 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 106 (1998) (The “jury trial was not simply
and always an individual right but also an institution of localism and popular sover-
eignty.”); Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 59 (2003) (“The purpose of the jury was
to inject the common-sense views of the community into a criminal proceeding to ensure
that an individual would not lose her liberty if it would be contrary to the community’s
sense of fundamental law and equity.”); Kory A. Langhofer, Comment, Unaccountable at the
Founding: The Originalist Case for Anonymous Juries, 115 YALE L.J. 1823, 1825 (2006) (“First,
venirepersons in the Founding era were local, drawn from relatively intimate communi-
ties.”); see id. at 1829 (“Local juries ‘were supposed to have . . . a prior and a perfect
knowledge . . . of the characters of the parties themselves, as of the witnesses.’” (quoting
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND AND AN ANALYSIS OF THE
CIVIL PART OF THE LAW 338 (6th ed. 1820))).
250 One can view famous examples of northern antislavery abolitionists refusing to con-
vict antislavery advocates under the Fugitive Slave Laws, and more recent examples of drug
prosecution failures in urban areas as examples of local justice rebalancing the criminal
justice system. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (1972) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The very essence of the jury’s function is its
role as a spokesman for the community conscience in determining whether or not blame
can be imposed.”); Barkow, supra note 249, at 58–59; see also William G. Young, Vanishing
Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2006) (“The
jury system proves the wisdom of the Founders in their utilization of direct democracy to
temper the potential excesses of the only unelected branch of government. . . . Through
the jury, we place the decisions of justice where they rightly belong in a democratic society:
in the hands of the governed.”).
251 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Jury Instructions as Constitutional Education, 84 U. COLO.
L. REV. 233, 233 (2013) (discussing juries as spaces of constitutional education).
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essary for a working democracy.252  Jury duty furthers citizenship by offering
a space for citizens to practice citizenship.253  The jury exists, and has always
existed, as an institution designed to train and educate citizens.254
In general, these differing roles of the jury coexist without great conflict.
In fact, the jury’s long survival may be attributable, at least in part, to its
ability to be all things to all people.  Precisely because the jury resists a singu-
lar definition, it can appeal to different groups (courts, citizens, litigants) in
different ways.  The rise of bright data adds complexity to this protean defini-
tion, because new data sources emphasize certain aspects of the jury role over
others.  Big data may end up defining the jury in ways that not everyone
would support.  This new reality is the subject of the next subsection.
2. The Tensions of Big Data and the Jury’s Role
Theoretically, bright data can create a perfectly representative jury based
on demographics, affinities, or really whatever attributes are plugged into the
algorithm.  Intentionally creating a representative jury, however, is itself a
value-laden decision.  This subsection addresses the positives and negatives of
a big data infused jury venire.
First, the creation of a technologically precise representative jury implies
that the traditional group of randomly selected jurors is not representative.
While frequently true as a demographic fact, this assertion strikes at the heart
of the image of the jury.  The goal of representativeness cuts against the idea
(or ideal) that a randomized, color-blind jury system treats all citizens
equally.255  One of the strongest arguments for keeping juries has been that
jury service serves a leveling function, where only citizenship matters and
identifying features do not.256  However, in a bright data world, if summoned
252 See Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, The Verdict on Juries, 91 JUDICATURE 226, 230
(2008) (“Jury service itself educates the public about the law and the legal system and
produces more positive views of the courts.”); Joanna L. Grossman, Note, Women’s Jury
Service: Right of Citizenship or Privilege of Difference, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1122 (1994) (“Jury
service thus educates citizens about politics, law, and civic institutions.”).
253 Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
131, 132 (1995) (“The core of the claim that education is necessary to citizenship must
instead be that education is necessary to the thoughtful or responsible exercise of citizen-
ship rights.”).
254 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1186
(1991) (“Like the church and the militia, the jury was in part an intermediate association
designed to educate and socialize its members into virtuous thinking and conduct.”); Paul
J. Garotto, Speech, Jury Service—A Citizen’s Duty, 13 NEB. ST. B.J. 111, 113 (1964) (“What
else do we have that can teach, exercise and strengthen so much political, social, moral
and religious virtue as does serving on a jury?”); Savage, supra note 241, at 46 (“Colonial
law court culture was about teaching colonists how to participate in the construction, legi-
timization and use of power.  The lessons learned in that ‘school’—in that law court cul-
ture—could transform the people involved.  In particular, colonial court culture offered
an opportunity for subjects to act as citizens.”).
255 See FERGUSON, supra note 241 (discussing the leveling effect of jury service).
256 See id.
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not because of citizenship alone, but because of citizenship plus segmenta-
tion, this ideal gets blurred.  You begin to represent something other than a
citizen.
Such a process also redefines the “community” in the community con-
science.  Because the juror is chosen to represent some other attribute or
affinity, the juror no longer simply represents the local community around
the courthouse.  Again, localism plus segmentation differs from simply repre-
senting the local community.  Scholars have thoroughly addressed the
problems with the idea that an individual stands in for the views of some
class, race, or gender.257  While diversity matters, being picked as “the
woman” to ensure gender diversity might well skew the process.  A juror
should not represent a group and bring that loyalty to court.258  Instead, soci-
ety expects jurors to act as citizens loyal only to their oath of objectivity and
fairness.
Similarly, in selecting jurors for diversity’s sake, the idea of randomness
becomes distorted.  Again, the conception that modern juries derive fairness
from their random selection represents one of the principal arguments in
favor of modern juries.259  The addition of an element of purposeful, precise
selection could affect this perception of fairness.  For example, in a case
involving the prosecution of a politician from one political party, a fear of
skewing the jury pool to include members of an opposing political party
might undermine the legitimacy of the verdict.
At the same time, ensuring a precisely diverse jury pool will provide
some advantages.  The loss of randomness could even enhance the legitimacy
of jury verdicts.  As argued earlier, perceived bias in the venire selection
underlies many fair cross-section challenges.  With a statistically balanced jury
venire, such fairness challenges will not succeed.
In addition, assuming that a diverse jury venire will lead to a more
diverse jury panel, jury deliberations may improve.  Numerous studies show
that diverse juries are better fact finders260 because different viewpoints and
perspectives provide for deeper and longer deliberation.261  Thus, a bright
257 See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 70, at 395 (“[T]here may be harmful effects on
juror self-perceptions when such diversity is achieved intentionally.  Such a procedure may
encourage jurors to think of themselves as advocates for their communities, potentially
compromising the impartiality of jury deliberations.  The analogy to legislative districting
may be particularly troublesome along these lines.”).
258 Id.
259 John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based upon or Affecting Religion, 34
SETON HALL L. REV. 435, 438 (2004) (discussing alternative theories of jury selection
including how randomness equals impartiality).
260 See, e.g., Hans & Vidmar, supra note 252, at 227 (“One of the most dramatic and
important changes over the last half century is the increasing diversity of the American
jury.  Heterogeneous juries have an edge in fact finding, especially when the matters at
issue incorporate social norms and judgments, as jury trials often do.”).
261 See, e.g., NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT 74–76
(2007).
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data jury might well determine facts in a more complete and thorough
manner.
Finally, bright data jury selection will likely have little effect on the struc-
tural or educational functions of the jury.  The Supreme Court has stated
that as long as a duly constituted body of citizens is interposed between the
prosecution and the defendant, issues of size, unanimity, and jury design may
not matter.  Thus, the Court would likely uphold a bright-data-inspired jury,
as long as it served its role as a structural check on the prosecution in a
criminal case or between the parties in a civil case.  No matter how jurors
were chosen, they would also learn the civic lessons built into the process.
3. Evaluating the Tensions
Courts seeking to evaluate the impact of bright data technologies on jury
selection will face a difficult task.  As set forth above, the arguments may col-
lide, depending on the perceived role of the jury.  While a bright data
selected jury will still provide structural protection, it may end up undermin-
ing the democratic and leveling roles of the jury.  Court administrators will
need to consider the impact of this change cautiously.
More interestingly, courts may need to conceptualize a more modern
theory of jury diversity.  Traditionally, courts have looked at diversity from a
broad categorical perspective, looking at who was excluded, not who was to
be included.  By not asking whether other types of people in the cross-section
of the community should be included, courts have never had to embrace the
harder question of who else should be included.  Perhaps certain age groups
(retirees, college students), statuses (professionals, mothers), ethnicities, or
religions should be targeted in mapping a more representative measure of
the community.  Such decisions would be fraught with difficult choices and
necessarily localized, but could offer a different vision of diversity for juries.
B. The Question of Privacy
Bright data’s impact on jury selection presents another dilemma for
courts in terms of juror privacy.  Jurors summoned to serve in the venire or
questioned for the jury panel do not expect that jury selection will involve
use of the full range of available consumer data.  Jurors generally expect to
be anonymous, more a juror number than a name.262  Jurors expect to arrive
as citizens, do their job, and then disappear back into society as faceless,
nameless members of a jury.263
Bright data changes these expectations.  The transparent use of bright
data techniques would be evident in voir dire and, if publicized, would also
impact the perception of who was selected for the venire, and why.  Privacy
concerns would pervade jurors’ thoughts in the courthouse.  Both the gener-
alized sense of an invasion of privacy, and the actual awareness of highly per-
262 In court, jurors are referred to by a number rather than a name.
263 See United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 775–76 (2d Cir. 1942).
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sonal matters might cause resentment, distrust, and could delegitimize the
jury system.
This Section sets out the tensions brought on by bright data and juror
privacy.  In many ways, bright data is simply the latest source of conflict in a
long history pitting litigants’, courts’, and jurors’ interests against one
another.  In addition, regardless of whether courts use the information, the
personal data already exists in easily accessible form for some litigants.  Thus,
any anger over privacy invasions directed at courts, while real, may be misdi-
rected.  Of course, as will be discussed in this Section and the next Section,
there also may be something especially threatening with having the court
system (as opposed to private entities) possess this information.
1. Existing Tensions of Juror Privacy
Juror privacy has long been a contested issue.264  In criminal cases, the
juror’s privacy rights run directly into the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to a fair trial.265  While one’s health, sexual experiences, or prior crimi-
nal history may be of no concern to others in the ordinary course of life, such
matters may be of interest to the court in a criminal case involving a related
issue.266  Voir dire, as a general matter, can be quite invasive.267  Courts in
both civil and criminal matters routinely find it necessary to inquire about
personal and embarrassing matters during rather lengthy questioning.268  As
Melanie Wilson has commented:
264 See Wilson, supra note 212, at 2030–33 (detailing the history of juror privacy in voir
dire).
265 Compare United States v. McDade, 929 F. Supp. 815, 817 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (noting
that voir dire inquiries into personal health information may conflict with “privacy
rights . . . ‘to be let alone’” (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting))), with Ackley v. Goodman, 516 N.Y.S.2d 667, 670 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
(juror rights outweighed by court rights); see also Wilson, supra note 212, at 2035–36
(“Outside of the voir dire process, jurors’ privacy is protected by various statutes and by the
Constitution.  But once part of the jury pool, citizens are treated as though their rights
evaporate.” (footnotes omitted)).
266 See David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror’s Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and
Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (1997) (“A . . . defendant’s right to a fair trial ranks
higher than any other entitlement within our constitutional structure.  Subsumed within
this general right is the specific requirement that the trial jury be impartial, and that poten-
tial jurors be questioned to determine if they possess ‘actual bias’ against the defendant.”).
267 See Alschuler, supra note 124, at 155 (“[W]e subject jurors to lengthy, privacy-invad-
ing voir dire examinations, requiring them to answer questions that would be considered
inappropriate and demeaning in other contexts.”); Wilson, supra note 212, at 2025
(“Because jurors play this critical role of deciding guilt and protecting the accused from
government overreaching, during the voir dire stage of the case, potential jurors are asked
to share information about their lives, quirks, proclivities and beliefs, and sometimes
insights into the lives of their friends, relatives, and loved ones who influence them.”).
268 See Babcock, supra note 211, at 549 (“[W]ithout a reasonable amount of informa-
tion about the prospective jurors, the litigant cannot realize his right to ‘select’ the jury by
challenges for cause and by peremptory strikes.”); Mary R. Rose, A Dutiful Voice: Justice in
the Distribution of Jury Service, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 601, 611 (2005) (“[J]ury selection can
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Litigants regularly ask questions to determine the influence of jurors’ rela-
tions with friends and loved ones, as well as the jurors’ experiences and per-
sonal habits.  Prospective jurors have been asked to reveal information about
their victimization, their health and use of legal and illegal medications,
their families and income levels, whether they have filed for bankruptcy,
their religious and political beliefs, their intimate sexual relationships, their
television habits, and many other potentially sensitive topics.269
These colloquies take place in a quasi-public space, subject to potentially
public revelation through appellate transcripts, and can feel quite
coercive.270
In response, courts have recognized some limited privacy rights for citi-
zens called as jurors.271  The Supreme Court has called juror privacy a “com-
pelling interest” when balancing privacy rights with the First Amendment
right of the press to know about public jury trials.272  Of course, mixing First
Amendment freedoms with the Sixth Amendment rights has only heightened
the tension around juror privacy.273  As evidenced by recent media-driven
scandal trials, the need to protect ordinary jurors from becoming national
targets of public criticism has intensified.274
and does pose inquiries into matters that some may see as uncomfortable and overly intru-
sive.  People must disclose in public experiences they may have kept even from close
friends (e.g., that they committed a crime or a have been a crime victim.”); see also id.
(“[E]ven if disclosures are not particularly intimate or emotionally arousing, voir dire may
also invade privacy if authorities ask ‘too much’ by posing questions regarded as unneces-
sary for or unrelated to determining juror impartiality.”).
269 Wilson, supra note 212, at 2033.
270 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Using Jury Questionnaires; (Ab)using Jurors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1,
25 (2007) (“Jurors are not volunteers.  They come to court under summons and answer
questionnaires under court order.  The sharing of private information is compelled under
threat of contempt of court.  Therefore, it can be expected that jurors may be reluctant
participants in unveiling their personal data.”).
271 See Lauren A. Rousseau, Privacy and Jury Selection: Does the Constitution Protect Prospec-
tive Jurors from Personally Intrusive Voir Dire Questions?, 3 RUTGERS J.L. & URB. POL’Y 287,
304–06 (2006).
272 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984) (“The jury
selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a pro-
spective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legit-
imate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.”).
273 See Marc O. Litt, “Citizen Soldiers” or Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment
Right of the Accused, the First Amendment Right of the Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 371, 371 (1992) (“Over the past twenty-five years, the Sixth
Amendment right of an accused to a fair criminal trial, the First Amendment right of the
media to gather and publish news and the privacy right of jurors have come into increasing
conflict.”); Scott Sholder, “What’s in a Name?”: A Paradigm Shift from Press-Enterprise to
Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions When Considering the Release of Juror-Identifying Information
in Criminal Trials, 36 AM. J. CRIM. L. 97, 99 (2009) (“Courts weigh and balance the First
Amendment rights of the press, the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant, the privacy
concerns of the jurors, and numerous policy considerations.”).
274 See, e.g., John C. Meringolo, The Media, the Jury, and the High-Profile Defendant: A
Defense Perspective on the Media Circus, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 981, 982 (2011) (“Over the last
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Juror privacy also remains at risk outside the voir dire process.275  Since
the time of the Founding, those litigants given access to lists of potential
jurors took the opportunity to investigate them.276  Since that time, investiga-
tion has become a regular occurrence in jurisdictions that provide this infor-
mation.277  Defense lawyers hire private investigators.278  Government
lawyers use existing government resources.279  While courts have maintained
certain limitations in order to prevent interference with jurors,280 external
seventy-five years in particular, media coverage of trials has steadily increased as a result of
rapid advancements in technology.  The increase in media coverage has led to the use of
the term ‘high-profile’ to define cases and defendants subjected to heightened media scru-
tiny.”); John Cloud, How the Casey Anthony Murder Case Became the Social-Media Trial of the
Century, TIME (June 16, 2011), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2077
969-2,00.html.
275 See Laura Cooper, Note, Voir Dire in Federal Criminal Trials: Protecting the Defendant’s
Right to an Impartial Jury, 48 IND. L.J. 269, 276–77 (1973) (“Outside investigations of pro-
spective jurors may seriously compromise the judicial system’s ability to give criminal
defendants a fair trial.  When jurors are aware that they have been investigated their fear or
resentment of the investigating party may influence their verdict.  If the inadequacies of
court-conducted voir dire result in outside investigations, the court may be permitting and
even encouraging undue invasions of the privacy of prospective jurors.  When there is pub-
lic knowledge of the prevalence of pre-trial investigations, citizens may become even more
determined to avoid jury service, further limiting the representativeness of the pool from
which trial jurors may be drawn.”).
276 See Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 616 (“In 1790, Congress passed the Public Acts of
the First Congress, which included provisions that gave defendants facing capital or trea-
son charges the right to access and investigate the jury venire list at least three days before
trial.”); see also id. (“The purpose of the statute was twofold.  First, it ‘put the defendant on
an even plane with the government in preparing for his defense by giving him the names
of the attending jurors.’  Second, the statute provided the defendant the opportunity to
discover information about potential jurors.” (quoting Stewart v. United States, 211 F. 41,
46 (9th Cir. 1914))).
277 See State v. Knerr, 426 N.W.2d 654, 656 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (“It is a recognized
practice for an attorney to make investigations of prospective jurors so that challenges can
be utilized intelligently.”); State v. Harbison, 238 S.E.2d 449, 453 (N.C. 1977) (stating that
juror lists were released fifty-five days prior to the start of trial); Robinson, supra note 197,
at 606 (“[T]he availability of juror lists prior to in-court voir dire allowed litigants enough
resources to undertake pretrial investigation of potential jurors using investigators and
other techniques.”).
278 See Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 617 (“The Philadelphia City Solicitor and District
Attorney relied on the local police, while private litigants turned to detectives and compa-
nies that specialized in juror-investigation services.  For a fee, these companies provided
attorneys with background information on prospective jurors.”).
279 See Robinson, supra note 197, at 607 (“Government attorneys, meanwhile, ‘make use
of the investigatory services of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue
Service and local police departments’ to research jurors.  In addition to FBI and IRS inves-
tigations of potential jurors, government attorneys have also investigated venieremen
through use of postal information and compilations of notes of their activities on prior
juries.” (quoting Cooper, supra note 275, at 276)).
280 See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 749, 765 (1929) (“The mere suspicion that
[the juror], his family, and friends are being subjected to surveillance by such persons is
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investigation became rather commonplace.  As Judge Raymond Rossi has
written:
 Investigation of potential jurors is not a new practice.  In criminal cases,
prosecutors acquired information through law enforcement agencies, while
defense attorneys obtained the background of potential jurors through pri-
vate detectives.  As ethical rules advanced to prohibit direct contact with
jurors before and during trial, law enforcement officials and private investi-
gators plied their craft by interviewing acquaintances of the jurors, reviewing
newspapers, conducting drive-bys of juror residences, and speaking with
jurors’ neighbors.281
While these techniques spurred vigorous debate,282 such privacy inva-
sions also engendered predictably negative views of jury service.  In fact, stud-
ies show that one reason why people resent jury service so much is this
perceived threat to privacy.283  Jurors feel unsettled that their personal lives
might be exposed,284 uncomfortable about answering personal questions,285
and concerned for their safety in certain criminal or otherwise high profile
cases.286  Clearly, all of these issues negatively impact jury yield rates and citi-
zen engagement with jury service.287
enough to destroy the equilibrium of the average juror and render impossible the exercise
of calm judgment upon patient consideration.”).
281 Rossi, supra note 139, at 515.
282 Compare Michael R. Glover, Comment, The Right to Privacy of Prospective Jurors During
Voir Dire, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 708, 711 (1982) (“Whalen and Nixon thus establish that an indi-
vidual has a constitutional right to privacy that protects him from the compelled disclosure
of personal matters with respect to which he has a reasonable expectation of privacy.”),
with Karen Monsen, Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price? Distinguishing Privacy Rights
from Privacy Interests; Rethinking Procedures to Protect Privacy in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 REV.
LITIG. 285, 288–95 (2002) (critiquing Glover’s argument).
283 See Paula L. Hannaford, Safeguarding Juror Privacy: A New Framework for Court Policies
and Procedures, 85 JUDICATURE 18, 18 (2001) (“Numerous studies document that perceived
insensitivity to the privacy concerns of prospective jurors is one cause of dissatisfaction with
jury service.”).
284 See Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note 142, at 1694 (“Jury duty is already
viewed as an unappetizing prospect for many Americans, and the loss of privacy associated
with comprehensive government background checks could prompt stiff resistance and
exacerbate juror absenteeism.”).
285 See United States v. Blagojevich, 614 F.3d 287, 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Most people
dread jury duty—partly because of privacy concerns.”).
286 See Nancy J. King, Nameless Justice: The Case for the Routine Use of Anonymous Juries in
Criminal Trials, 49 VAND. L. REV. 123, 126 (1996) (“Juror apprehension about safety and
privacy may be at an all-time high.”).
287 See John E. Nowak, Jury Trials and First Amendment Values in “Cyber World”, 34 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1213, 1247 (2001) (“[T]he thought that one’s entire life will be open to the
government and public through jury service certainly may well deter most people from
wanting to serve on a jury.”).
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2. Additional Tensions in Juror Privacy with Bright Data
Jury selection using bright data potentially exacerbates many of these
traditional privacy concerns because bright data relies on invasive, compre-
hensive, personal data from commercial sources,288 Internet sources,289 and
social media sources290 with the ability to reveal an even greater level of
detail about citizens.291  If known to jurors beforehand, or revealed through
voir dire questions, this type of invasion could make citizens even less willing
to participate in jury service.292
Exposure alone might reveal embarrassing information in a public (or at
least publicly accessible) manner.  It is one thing to answer in response to
direct questions by the judge, but another experience entirely to face ques-
tions based on information revealed about your personal life through out-of-
court sources.  In fact, if handled inappropriately, such a potential revelation
might well delegitimize the jury system completely.293
288 See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other
Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 595 (2004); Slobogin, supra note 151, at 190–91; Daniel J. Solove, Access and
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137 (2002); Daniel
J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
65, 69–83 (2006); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 151, at 251; Matthew Tokson, Automation
and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 638 (2011).
289 See Morrison, supra note 72, at 1606 (“Ever more intrusive searches are recom-
mended as an enhancement to jury selection, including searching the county sheriff’s
online arrest records, ‘obtaining the exact dollar amounts and dates of a juror’s recent
contributions to political campaigns,’ and using Google Street View to see jurors’ front
yards.” (quoting Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for Lawyers, 28 TRIAL
ADVOC. Q. 12, 13 (2009))).
290 See Kathryn Kinnison Van Namen, Comment, Facebook Facts and Twitter Tips—Prose-
cutors and Social Media: An Analysis of the Implications Associated with the Use of Social Media in
the Prosecution Function, 81 MISS. L.J. 549, 551, 555–59 (2012).
291 See Allen, supra note 153, at 246–47 (2013) (“Private sector surveillance is rampant,
introducing research about personality assessment and classification into the legal litera-
ture.  Increasingly, the personality and psychology of individual consumers are probed
without their knowledge or consent.”); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 151, at 251 (“Big
data poses big privacy risks.  The harvesting of large sets of personal data and the use of
state of the art analytics implicate growing privacy concerns.”).
292 See Morrison, supra note 72, at 1607 (“If jurors begin to realize that jury duty entails
not only the inconvenience of taking time off of work and other obligations but also
involves wholesale intrusion into their online lives, it might do ‘great damage to the will-
ingness of most citizens to participate in jury duty.’” (quoting Anne Constable, Background
Checks of Jurors Routine, NEW MEXICAN, Sept. 24, 2009, at A4, NewsRoom, 2009 WLNR
18866409)).
293 See Wilson, supra note 212, at 2044 (“Jurors who experience negative feelings about
jury service may not appear the next time they are summonsed, and given the large num-
ber of jurors called for duty each year, society may lose confidence that the system is fair
and workable.”).  Of course, as discussed previously, if courts chose to implement bright
data procedures, they could and should screen and block out certain irrelevant and
revealing personal information.
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At the same time, additional data about jurors might obviate the need
for direct, embarrassing questions in court.  Litigants receiving a dossier fil-
led with personal information about a juror could dismiss or avoid even ask-
ing questions to certain people who might otherwise be required to give
embarrassing answers.  One might not need to ask about personal bank-
ruptcy or financial difficulties if this information was already provided to the
parties.  Indirect knowledge of an embarrassing fact might equally invade a
juror’s privacy (in both cases the bankruptcy is known), but be less uncom-
fortable than facing direct questions about the subject.294
The impact of bright data information on voir dire may turn on local
practice.  In information-rich voir dire jurisdictions (where lawyers can ask
detailed questions over lengthy periods, or where questionnaires are exten-
sively employed) the addition of bright data will add a level of depth to the
questioning and speed things along.  In information-poor voir dire jurisdic-
tions (including federal courts), this information will significantly expand
the amount of information available about potential jurors.  In both cases, it
will provide better information, and hopefully allow for better selection
decisions.
Finally, if the court and the parties remain concerned about getting
truthful and fair jurors who can impartially decide the facts, better informa-
tion will root out intentional and unintentional falsehoods.  Sometimes,
jurors are unaware of their own biases.295  Additional information about the
jurors may help lawyers identify when the juror has failed to recognize a
potential bias.  For example, in a shooting case, a juror who forgets to reveal
substantial donations to anti-gun advocacy organizations might be asked
some follow-up questions.  Sometimes jurors shade the truth because of the
questions.296  Sometimes jurors just lie.  Either way, bright data will help
expose implicit and explicit biases.297
294 See MARDER, supra note 225, at 82–83 (“For example, lawyers have sometimes
wanted to ask prospective jurors about their religion or sexual orientation during voir dire,
but judges have usually denied such inquiries on the ground that it is an intrusion into the
juror’s privacy and not necessary for the parties to know.”).
295 See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1984) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring in judgment) (“[T]he bias of a juror will rarely be admitted by the juror
himself, ‘partly because the juror may have an interest in concealing his own bias and
partly because the juror may be unaware of it.’” (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
221–22 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring))).
296 Wilson, supra note 212, at 2037 (“Nevertheless, when a judge permits the litigants to
ask potential jurors questions that require embarrassing answers, the voir dire process may
backfire and result in less, and inaccurate, information about juror biases.”).
297 See Commercial Printing Co. v. Lee, 553 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Ark. 1977) (en banc)
(“Cases have been reversed . . . because of answers given by prospective jurors on voir dire
which subsequent investigation established were false, or at least incorrect, and which
might have well disqualified the prospective juror.”); Roberts, supra note 116, at 851–52;
Elliott Wilcox, Are Jurors Lying to You During the Jury Selection Process?, TRIALTHEATER, http://
www.trialtheater.com/jury-selection/jury-selection-jurors-who-lie.htm (last visited Dec. 19,
2015).
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3. Evaluating the Tensions
Courts facing the bright data dilemma might choose to embrace new
technologies, if only because the technologies will impinge on juror privacy
regardless of their decision.  Litigants in an adversarial system will likely con-
tinue to use any available means to gain tactical advantages for their clients.
This will mean continued use of big data information systems, especially for
those with the financial means to do so.298  Real-time online and social media
investigation of jurors will become the new normal,299 especially in high pro-
file cases,300 high monetary value cases, or other cases in which juror insights
can provide tactical advantages.301
Currently, few rules prevent lawyers from performing such investigation,
and courts may be powerless to stop such practices because of ethical respon-
sibilities and First Amendment considerations.302  The American Bar Associa-
tion has recently issued an ethics opinion allowing such Internet and social
media investigation into jurors.303  Some commentators have even argued
that such investigation might be ethically required of counsel.304
298 See Redgrave & Stover, supra note 44, at 211–12.
299 See Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, REUTERS (Feb. 17, 2011,
2:49 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-courts-voirdire-idUS-
TRE71G4VW20110217 (“[L]awyers conduct extensive online searches about dozens of
members of a prospective pool and compile them into elaborate spreadsheets.  Some of
this plays out in courtrooms in real time, as lawyers and jury consultants, armed with
laptops and smart-phones, seek clues about whether a would-be juror would side with a
homeowner in a product-liability case, say, or with a cop in a police-brutality suit.”).
300 See Morrison, supra note 209, at 9.
301 See Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 614 (“Some attorneys use the practice in an effort
to create a bond with the jurors.  For instance, an attorney who discovers through her
online investigation that a juror closely follows sports might incorporate athletic references
or metaphors in the courtroom to better connect with that juror.”).
302 See Ana Campoy & Ashby Jones, Searching for Details Online, Lawyers Facebook the Jury,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870356160457
6150841297191886 (“Some appellate courts have upheld lawyers’ rights to research jurors
online, including one in New Jersey that ruled last year that a lower-court judge erred by
prohibiting a plaintiffs’ attorney from using the Internet in the courtroom.  The court
wrote: The fact that the plaintiffs’ lawyer ‘had the foresight to bring his laptop computer to
court and defense counsel did not, simply cannot serve as a basis for judicial intervention
in the name of ‘fairness’ or maintaining a ‘level playing field.’”).
303 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 466 (2014), http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/formal_
opinion_466_final_04_23_14.authcheckdam.pdf (discussing the use of jurors’ Internet
presence); Terry Carter, Lawyers Can Look Up Jurors on Social Media but Can’t Connect with
Them, ABA Ethics Opinion Says, ABA J. (Apr. 24, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://www.abajournal
.com/news/article/jurors_electronic_social_media_ethics_opinion.
304 See, e.g., Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 627–29; Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the
Internet and Other Electronic Sources on an Attorney’s Duty of Competence Under the Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 89, 95–102 (2000).
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Extrajudicial efforts to regulate such practices may prove equally
unhelpful as big data remains an underregulated area of law.305  For those
reasons, courts might choose to utilize bright data, if only to shape and con-
trol its impact on voir dire.  With court oversight, judges could permit use of
certain information available from bright data.  Courts could forbid discus-
sion of, or questions about, other data.  Courts shaping the message—even
an uncomfortable message—might find that they are, institutionally, in a bet-
ter position to have a real effect.306  Explaining that this information is
already available to the parties,307 and is being used to make the process
easier, quicker, and less embarrassing might go a long way toward easing the
sense of privacy invasion.308  Revelation of the information might seem less
invasive to jurors if originating from a transparent and public process con-
trolled by the court, rather than from independent discovery by the par-
305 See Crawford & Schultz, supra note 149, at 106 (discussing the lack of traditional
privacy protections when it comes to predictive big data); see also id. at 109 (“[T]he power
of Big Data analyses to evade or marginalize traditional privacy protections and
frameworks, its drive to bring visibility to the invisible, and its dynamic and unpredictable
nature all present challenges to thinking about how privacy and Big Data can coexist.”);
Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders: A Tort for the Misuse of Personal Information, 66
MD. L. REV. 140, 142–43 (2006) (“[M]ost types of personal information—including names,
birthdates, addresses, telephone numbers, clickstream data, travel details (flights, car rent-
als, hotels, train tickets) and transactional data (who bought what from whom, when,
where, and how)—are unregulated, unless the data trader violates its own privacy policy, in
which case the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can hold the company accountable for
unfair trade practices.  Thus it is currently legal—in the sense that there is no penalty—for
data traders to sell personal information without the consent of the subject, to deny indi-
viduals information about the quantity or categories of lists that contain their information,
and to deny any requests to remove personal information from these lists.” (footnotes
omitted)).
306 Cohen, supra note 153, at 1912 (“Citizenship is more than a status.  It is also a set of
practices—voting, public debate, and so on—and so the scope for the practice of citizen-
ship will be defined in part by the practices that existing institutions encourage, permit, or
foreclose.  Less often acknowledged is that institutions configure citizens, inculcating hab-
its of mind and behavior that lend themselves more readily to certain types of practices
than to others.  Institutions shape not only the scope but also the capacity for
citizenship.”).
307 Eileen E. Rosen & Catherine M. Barber, Criminal Background Checks of Prospective
Jurors: Uncovering Unacceptable Juror Bias and Preventing Unnecessary Post-Verdict Litigation, 60
FED. LAW. 54, 56 (2013) (“While it seems natural to consider possible invasion of privacy
whenever the government inquires about someone’s background for something they are
required to do, in reality, such an ‘invasion’ of jurors’ privacy is no more intrusive than if
the parties simply asked questions about their criminal background during voir dire.”); see
also Matt O’Connor, Jury Pools Can Face Probes in Sensitive Trials, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2006),
articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-12-11/news/0612110203_1_background-checks-jurors-
high-profile-trials (stating that some courts allow criminal background checks of jurors).
308 Rossi, supra note 139, at 516 (“Privacy worries from online investigation of jurors
may be lessened if jurors are advised why the research is helpful to impaneling a jury.
Jurors should also be reminded that any information uncovered is publicly available.”).
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ties.309  Studies have shown that perceptions of privacy harm can depend on
how the disclosure is framed.310
Finally, issues of distributional justice would be marginally improved.
Adopting a bright data system overseen by the courts would equalize the
informational playing field for all lawyers.311  Money and outside jury consul-
tants will not be replaced, but the cost of obtaining information about the
jurors will be reduced.  Certainly, the largest of informational imbalances
would be corrected to allow for a more equitable system.
C. The Question of Power
In addition to concerns about juror privacy, the issue of governmental
power arises.  Providing courts with vast amounts of personal data about
jurors impacts the current power balance between the court and citizens.312
As privacy scholars have articulated, governmental collection of information
can have discriminatory, exclusionary, and chilling effects on subject citi-
zens.313  Government aggregation of data can have negative outcomes, par-
309 Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 79–80 (2013) (“[I]ndividuals’ appetites for data shar-
ing are fickle.  For example, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University have shown that
survey respondents are more willing to divulge sensitive information after being told that
previous respondents made similarly sensitive disclosures.” (citing Alessandro Acquisti et
al., The Impact of Relative Standards on the Propensity to Disclose, 49 J. MARKETING RES. 160, 162
(2012))).
310 Strahilevitz, Privacy Law, supra note 19, at 2022 (“[T]he use of Big Data may entail
privacy costs for consumers who do not want people or even machines to have access to
information that those consumers regard as personal.  Consumers will be highly heteroge-
neous in the way they experience these consequences: some will experience significant
harm, and others will not feel harmed in any way.”).
311 Joseph W. Jerome, Buying and Selling Privacy: Big Data’s Different Burdens and Benefits,
66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 51 (2013) (“Big data could effectuate a democratization of
information but, generally, information is a more potent tool in the hands of the
powerful.”).
312 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1953 (2013)
(“[T]he gathering of information affects the power dynamic between the watcher and the
watched, giving the watcher greater power to influence or direct the subject of surveil-
lance.  It might sound trite to say that ‘information is power,’ but the power of personal
information lies at the heart of surveillance.  The power effects of surveillance illustrate
three additional dangers of surveillance: blackmail, discrimination, and persuasion.” (foot-
note omitted)).
313 See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on
the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 308–09 (2011); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informa-
tional Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1424–25 (2000); Viktor Mayer-
Scho¨nberger, Beyond Privacy, Beyond Rights—Toward a “Systems” Theory of Information Govern-
ance, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1853, 1859–61 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Pri-
vate-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 938 (2008);
Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-Disclosure
Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011); Richards, supra note 312, at 1956 (“The
bottom line about surveillance and persuasion is that surveillance gives the watcher infor-
mation about the watched.  That information gives the watcher increased power over the
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ticularly in the context of political and civil rights.314  Collection of
information about citizens undermines core constitutional values of free
association, political dissent, and free expression.315  This Section looks spe-
cifically at how possession and use of this juror data by courts might affect
this court-citizen power relationship.  Courts play a special role in the consti-
tutional structure which both exacerbates and moderates the potential of big
data becoming perceived as “Big Brother” during jury selection.
1. A Potential Power Imbalance
The traditional concern about governmental collection of information
involves its impact on personal freedom, autonomy, and expression.316  As
scholars have noted, awareness of governmental surveillance itself affects
behavior.317  In a big data world, courts would know more about potential
jurors.  Some of this knowledge might lead to positive outcomes like better
jury yields, and a better utilization rate for responding jurors.  On the other
hand, some knowledge could be quite Orwellian in nature.318  After all, citi-
watched that can be used to persuade, influence, or otherwise control them, even if they
do not know they are being watched or persuaded.”).
314 Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Identification Sys-
tem, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 48 (2002) (“Identity systems and documents have a long
history of uses and abuses for social control and discrimination.”).
315 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (“Anonymity is a
shield from the tyranny of the majority . . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill
of Rights, and of the First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an intolerant society.” (cita-
tion omitted)); Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 288, at 1193 (“In addition to
facilitating the monitoring and control of individuals, such a dossier may make a person a
‘prisoner of his recorded past.’  Records of personal information can easily be used by
government leaders and officials for improper monitoring of individuals.  Indeed, such
data can be used for whatever task is at hand—a tool available to anyone in power in
government for use to further the current passion or whim of the day.” (quoting U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
112 (1973), http://www.justice.gov/opcl/docs/rec-com-rights.pdf)).
316 Richards, supra note 312, at 1954 (“The risk of the improper use of surveillance
records persists over time.  Most of the former communist states in Eastern Europe have
passed laws strictly regulating access to the surveillance files of the communist secret
police.  The primary purpose of such laws is to prevent the blackmail of political candi-
dates who may have been surveilled under the former regime.”).
317 See, e.g., Grayson Barber, Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the Pub-
lic Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 102 (2006) (“The loss of anonymity
can easily be exploited to burden the First Amendment right to free association and other
liberty interests.”); Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1417 (2001) (“Dataveillance is thus a new form
of surveillance, a method of watching not through the eye or the camera, but by collecting
facts and data.”).
318 See generally GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (1949).
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zens may freely ignore even the most targeted and perceptive marketing
pitch, but cannot ignore a jury summons.319
The court’s unique role in society also adds complexity to the analysis.
On the one hand, courts are incredibly powerful institutions, so giving them
additional power might intimidate citizens.  Providing courts with personal
information about jurors could undermine jurors’ willingness to stand up to
courts, minimizing the jury’s role as a check on the power of courts and
judges.  This is no small matter, as the jury has structurally been designed to
counter the power of the courts.  It is easier to challenge power anony-
mously, and concerns about blackmail or retaliation by judges or litigants
who know juror secrets (while perhaps unfounded) could affect jury verdicts.
On the other hand, court systems can also be viewed as public, neutral
institutions, less threatening as a surveillance entity than law enforcement,
the Internal Revenue Service, or other data-rich governmental organiza-
tions.320  Court systems have the ability to control which people arrive as
jurors, but less ability to investigate wrongdoing or exercise other executive
powers.321  With the exception of creating lists for grand jurors, entities that
at least theoretically have that type of investigatory power, courts may collect
the data, but have little ability to use it for purposes other than jury selection.
In addition, as discussed previously, while citizens might perceive a problem
in courts holding vast stores of information about them, the real point of
tension is with the private collection of data, not with courts utilization of
such already-collected data.
A less traditional concern arises directly from the unique ability of big
data to segment groups.322  In much the same way that courts and legisla-
tures historically excluded certain groups from jury service through the use
of discriminatory processes (based on race and gender), big data could be
used to sort out or exclude certain groups from jury service.323  A sorting
algorithm can sort out non-citizens or individuals with felony convictions,
consistent with current permissible exclusions.  The sorting algorithm could,
however, just as easily exclude college students, social advocates, or Tea Party
members, raising a host of fairness concerns.  Privacy advocates might be
especially concerned if exclusions were based on political advocacy, court
319 Most jurisdictions provide for a civil penalty or contempt sanction for intentionally
failing to appear for jury duty.
320 See Steven A. Bercu, Toward Universal Surveillance in an Information Age Economy: Can
We Handle Treasury’s New Police Technology?, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 383, 440 (1994).
321 Of course, courts have the contempt power which provides some limited investiga-
tive authority, but, in comparison to the executive branch authorities, the judiciary has the
least amount of investigatory power.
322 Richards, supra note 312, at 1957 (“The power of sorting can bleed imperceptibly
into the power of discrimination.”).
323 Lerman, supra note 154, at 60 (“[B]ig data threatens more than just privacy.  It
could also jeopardize political and social equality by relegating vulnerable people to an
inferior status.”).
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criticism, or even prior jury service.324  Worse still, if the algorithms could be
manipulated, attributes such as being prosecution-oriented or plaintiff-
friendly could also be used to exclude or include jurors to the detriment of
the fairness of the jury system.325  As a big picture issue, then, big data creates
concerns about the danger of purposeful exclusions.326
The questions get even more difficult as one thinks through how a fair
cross-section would be designed.  Including certain groups in the jury pool
means excluding other individuals from other groups.327  An algorithm ran-
domly picking a proportionate grouping by race, gender, age, income,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, religion, geography, and other available attrib-
utes, will leave out certain other individuals.  One might imagine that the
court would repeatedly summon individuals identifying with several of the
categories (a poor, white, Jewish lesbian) in order to satisfy multiple variables
through one juror.  Others might never be summoned.  Such an imbalance
would reflect poorly on the goal of a randomly distributed civic obligation
giving more power to the selectors and less to the citizens.328
Big data collection also misses those not in the datasets.  Commercial big
data collection might overlook certain individuals and groups because they
do not offer attractive consumer targets.329  If big data systems remain tied to
commercial and marketing interests, incentives to collect information about
everyone (such as in a government census) would need to be created.330
Potential gaps in data collection merely represent inefficiencies for data com-
panies, but those same gaps represent fundamental failures for court systems
trying to include everyone in jury service.  Omitting certain segments from
324 Ira P. Robbins, “Bad Juror” Lists and the Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose, 22 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2012).
325 One might imagine that certain personal characteristics might correlate with being
prosecution-oriented or defense-oriented, and that use of these characteristics could be
used to sway the jury pool.
326 Richards, supra note 312, at 1956 (“Many kinds of surveillance are routinely used to
sort people into categories.  Some of these forms of sorting are insidious.  Consider, for
example, the use of census records by the American, Canadian, and German governments
during the Second World War to identify citizens to relocate to the Japanese internment
camps in North America and the concentration camps in Europe.”).
327 Id. at 1957 (“The power of sorting can bleed imperceptibly into the power of
discrimination.”).
328 Lerman, supra note 154, at 59 (“[P]oliticians and governments may come to rely on
big data to such a degree that exclusion from data flows leads to exclusion from civic and
political life—a barrier to full citizenship.”).
329 Id.
330 Id. (“In a future where big data, and the predictions it makes possible, will funda-
mentally reorder government and the marketplace, the exclusion of poor and otherwise
marginalized people from datasets has troubling implications for economic opportunity,
social mobility, and democratic participation.  These technologies may create a new kind
of voicelessness, where certain groups’ preferences and behaviors receive little or no con-
sideration when powerful actors decide how to distribute goods and services and how to
reform public and private institutions.”).
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the potential jury pool would further distort the power balance, again giving
far more power to the selecting entities rather than the citizens.331
2. Other Balancing Issues
Bright data has other less obvious power balancing effects.  More infor-
mation about jurors gives lawyers more power in the voir dire process.  The
traditional jury selection system in low-information jurisdictions (federal
court, etc.) puts great emphasis on the role of the judge to moderate the
information discussed in jury selection.  Judges limit the content and quan-
tity of questions.332  However, bright data returns that power to the hands of
the litigants.  Further, the court’s provision of the information to the parties
would democratize the process, providing both rich and poor litigants with
an equal informational starting point.333
In addition, a transparent voir dire system that revealed how the jury
venire was selected, would educate jurors about the selection system.334  Cur-
rently, a jury summons arrives out of the blue, with a sense of randomness
that can be disconcerting since most selection systems are not public or well
understood.  Adding a level of transparency about how the algorithms were
designed, and the sources of information utilized in the selection process
would also add some accountability into the jury selection process.335  While
jurors would not be told why they were chosen as part of the group, they
might get a sense that the choice was purposeful, not purely random.
At the same time, issues of court integrity could arise if citizens viewed
the system as beholden to commercial interests.  A court system’s indepen-
dence could be questioned by the influence of big data companies.  First,
courts’ use of private data would blur the public-private divide.336  Second,
331 Id. at 60 (“Just as U.S. election districts—and thus U.S. democracy—depend on the
accuracy of census data, so too will policymaking increasingly depend on the accuracy of
big data and advanced analytics.  Exclusion or underrepresentation in government
datasets, then, could mean losing out on important government services and public goods.
The big data revolution may create new forms of inequality and subordination, and thus
raises broad democracy concerns.”).
332 Lisa A. Blue & Robert B. Hirschhorn, Goals and Practical Tips for Voir Dire, 26 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 233, 261 (2002) (“Federal judges tend to severely limit the lawyer’s ability to
ask questions during voir dire.”).
333 Hoffmeister, supra note 8, at 630 (“[T]he average criminal defendant could rarely
afford the costs associated with investigating a jury.”).
334 The information could be made available on public court websites or provided with
the initial summons.
335 See generally Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fair-
ness, and Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008) (discussing the
importance of transparency and accountability in designing search algorithms); Frank Pas-
quale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet
Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010).
336 Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 288, at 1193 (“Not only are public records
altering the power that the government can exercise over people’s lives, but they are also
contributing to the growing power of private sector entities.”).
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courts would have a financial interest in the data, which could pose a prob-
lem when the data companies themselves are litigants.337  Further, as com-
mercial enterprises, these data companies would have an incentive to provide
similar information to those institutions that could pay for it.  Thus, private
litigants in a high stakes trial might wish to buy direct access to the court
information by purchasing it directly from the big data companies.  The
incentives of these litigants could distort (or be perceived to distort) an oth-
erwise fair selection system.
Finally, as the system progresses, the court itself would be sitting on valu-
able data.  Being able to track who gets selected as a juror, and connecting
this information to trial outcomes, judgments, etc. would add yet another
very valuable dataset to the world of big data.  Companies would have every
incentive to pay handsomely for access, leaving courts in a difficult financial
dilemma about whether to allow this collection.  Courts might be faced with
very attractive financial incentives to allow this type of data tracking, leading
to additional questions about the integrity and fairness of the legal system.
3. Evaluating the Power Balance Question
While governmental collection of personal information raises a host of
issues, they are not new issues.  Governmental agencies collect and retain a
tremendous amount of private details about our lives, from the information
in our tax returns, to government-organized health care, to census informa-
tion, and other public benefits data.338  We currently live with the knowledge
that the government possesses this information without great concern.  Our
confidence rests with measures taken to protect that sensitive information.
Furthermore, we assume courts are public institutions entrusted to han-
dle public disputes in a public manner.339  The transparency involved in pub-
licly sharing court records with court reporters and through court transcripts
is supposed to be a positive thing in a democracy, not a negative one.340  The
public trust comes because courts are publicly open.  As long as data collec-
tion policies remain transparent, courts may benefit from this prior good will
as an institution of public justice.
337 One can imagine that if the vendor for the court system were itself a party to a
lawsuit, real questions about the fairness of the jury impaneled would need to be answered.
338 Barber, supra note 317, at 64 (“In order to receive government services, in order to
do business with the government, and in order to be a law-abiding citizen, one must pro-
vide one’s home address, telephone number (listed or unlisted), and much more to the
government.  The government, therefore, must protect the public interest by maintaining
the privacy of personal information in government files.”).
339 Id. at 92 (“Court records have long been presumed open to the public, and the
tradition of public access to court case files is rooted in constitutional principles.”).
340 Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online
Court Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 774 (2012) (“Because records
provide an essential window into the functioning of one of the three pillars of govern-
ment—the courts—citizens are presumed to have a right to inspect them to ensure that
courts are exercising their powers not only competently and fairly but also within the limits
of their mandate.”).
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Establishing data protections to limit access to juror data, such as use
restrictions, access restrictions, and regular purging of information, repre-
sents the key to remedying any perceived power imbalance.  Courts, because
of the powerful status they hold in society, will need to be perceived as affirm-
atively protecting personal data.341  A strong, data-protective system will
reduce concerns about a power imbalance, and ease fears about the abusive
use of that data.  Finally, all financial incentives must be removed so that
money does not tempt the court to profit from its collection and use of per-
sonal data.
D. The Question of Pretext
As discussed, litigants who seek to obtain tactical advantages in trial
might have a strong interest in big data.  This reality does little to address the
continued discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.342  In fact, under
current practice, bright data simply gives litigants a wider array of identifiable
facts to justify a strike.  The problem of pretext exists in current Batson prac-
tice and only increases with access to more personal information.343  With
big data, litigants can now provide numerous race- or gender-related, but not
unconstitutional, reasons for a strike.  In essence, this new personal informa-
tion presents a large scale Batson workaround.
This problem has no easily identifiable solution.  An overtly racist lawyer
will be able to craft a far more defensible race-neutral justification based on
personal data unrelated to race.  In addition, lawyers unaware of biases will
341 Barber, supra note 317, at 63 (“Governmental agencies, including the courts, have a
special obligation to protect the public’s interest in individual privacy.  Government
records and court records are being harvested for personal information about individuals,
contributing to a surge in identity theft, consumer profiling, and the development of a
stratified society where individuals are pigeonholed according to the electronic trail they
leave of transactions that disclose personal details about them.”).
342 EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 125, at 4 (“[P]erhaps no arena of public life or
governmental administration where racial discrimination is more widespread, apparent,
and seemingly tolerated than in the selection of juries.”); Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara
O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-
Batson North Carolina Capital Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531, 1533 (2012) (“Over the twenty-
year period we examined, prosecutors struck eligible black venire members at about 2.5
times the rate they struck eligible venire members who were not black.”); Strahilevitz, Repu-
tation Nation, supra note 142, at 1689 (“[T]he relevant decisionmakers [lawyers] appear to
rely heavily on characteristics that they can discern at a relatively low cost—race, gender,
age, and national origin.”).
343 Bruce Hamilton, Note, Bias, Batson, and “Backstrikes”: Snyder v. Louisiana Through a
Glass, Starkly, 70 LA. L. REV. 963, 979 (2010) (“Because voir dire offers lawyers little oppor-
tunity to gather information about prospective jurors, they are likely to rely on group affili-
ations.  One study of 191 claims of juror discrimination found that fifty-two percent of the
reasons for rejection involved group stereotypes.” (footnote omitted)); see Miller-El v.
Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 270 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of race- and gender-
based stereotypes in the jury-selection process seems better organized and more systema-
tized than ever before.”).
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rely on other proxies to justify their implicitly discriminatory strikes.344  More
and better data makes this practice more likely, and harder to identify or
correct.  Under the existing Batson standard, appellate courts will not reverse
convictions if sufficient details justify the strike.  Thus, courts deciding
whether to adopt bright data jury selection methods will need to recognize
that the already porous protections of Batson could become all but
nonexistent.
At the same time, the centrality of race, gender, and ethnicity may prove
secondary to other considerations.  With more detailed personal informa-
tion, broad-brush stereotypes become less helpful.345  At the end of the day,
lawyers want to win cases, and individual characteristics, rather than stereo-
types, will be far more important.346  For defense lawyers in a federal drug
prosecution, who might ordinarily strike white wealthy men on the assump-
tion that they would be less sympathetic with their clients, knowledge that a
potential white wealthy man donated regularly to libertarian causes and nee-
dle exchanges, or subscribed to anti-government magazines might change
the calculus.  The focus would not be on race or gender, but the sympathies
identified by those individual data points.347
344 See, e.g., Deana Kim El-Mallawany, Comment, Johnson v. California and the Initial
Assessment of Batson Claims, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3333, 3353–54 (2006) (recognizing that
“[p]roof of intent to discriminate is particularly elusive because, as Justice Marshall
warned, racism may be conscious or unconscious in the minds of striking parties and
judges presiding over voir dire” (footnote omitted)).
345 RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 165 (2003) (“[T]he less infor-
mation attorneys have about potential jurors, the more attorneys have to rely on gross
stereotypes in the exercise of their peremptories, and the likelihood increases that jurors
will be excused on what are in reality race-based and gender-motivated challenges. . . .
[M]ore information about the jurors helps satisfy the goals of Batson . . . .”); Robinson,
supra note 197, at 599–600 (“Jurors’ online presence—their online profiles, blog posts,
Twitter messages, and online comments—as well as the other information available about
jurors online can be a ‘treasure trove of information about potential . . . jurors’ during voir
dire and trial.  Now, instead of relying on stereotypes and intuition to vet jurors during voir
dire, litigators may use the vast resources available online to find information about poten-
tial jurors that is unlikely to come out during the usual voir dire process.” (footnotes omit-
ted) (quoting Julie Kay, Social Networking Sites Help Vet Jurors, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 13, 2008),
http://www.legaltechnews.com/id=1202423725315?back=law)).
346 Tania Tetlow, How Batson Spawned Shaw—Requiring the Government to Treat Citizens
as Individuals When It Cannot, 49 LOY. L. REV. 133, 165 (2003) (“[L]awyers are less likely to
rely on racial stereotypes when they have more information about jurors.  Expanded voir
dire is essential, because ‘the more that is known about each individual juror, the less
important imputed group characteristics become in an attorney’s determination of how
that individual is likely to react to the evidence and arguments at issue.” (quoting Ogletree,
supra note 128, at 1126)).
347 Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation, supra note 142, at 1693 (“[T]he law might address
the problem of racially exclusionary uses of peremptory strikes by providing more informa-
tion, not less. . . . The government could report to the parties jurors’ credit scores, military
service records, bankruptcy filings, and involvement in prior litigation.  It could review
mental health records in the state’s possession to screen out those who might be unfit for
service.  It could scour public records and conduct LexisNexis searches to provide the
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Arguably, discrimination based on other attributes rather than imper-
missible attributes signals an improvement toward a color-blind society.  Yet,
if the result—an un-diverse jury—is the same, perhaps it offers little to
celebrate.
E. The Question of Constitutionality
Any jury selection system that explicitly considers race or gender raises
potential constitutional concerns.  For this reason, many court systems have
not even suggested altering the dim data approach to jury selection.  At the
same time, other courts, and some scholars, have offered race conscious jury
selection alternatives.348  This Section examines the potential equal protec-
tion concerns with using race and gender as explicit factors among other big
data attributes.349
1. Equal Protection Concerns
In a series of cases involving schooling, hiring, and voting, the Supreme
Court has rejected the use of race to remedy past or existing discrimina-
tion.350  As the Court stated, “Government action that classifies individuals
on the basis of race is inherently suspect and carries the danger of perpetuat-
ing the very racial divisions the polity seeks to transcend.”351  Any such racial
classification must survive “strict scrutiny” review, which means that racial
“classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored to further
compelling governmental interests.”352  This standard applies even if the
race conscious policies purport to benefit minorities or increase diversity.353
parties with any relevant information.”); id. (“If the government did all these things, essen-
tially providing dossiers on all prospective jurors, one might expect to see less discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, national origin, religion, gender, and other immutable
characteristics.  Indeed, a regime of full and symmetrical disclosure of juror profile infor-
mation to the litigants conceivably could do more to combat the improper use of race as a
proxy than Batson ever has.”).
348 Morrison, supra note 33, at 23 (describing the different proposals offered by schol-
ars over the years).
349 It must be made clear that the value added by big data extends well beyond the
broad categories of race and gender.  One does not need big data technologies to select a
jury venire based on race and gender, since that information is already observable without
big data.
350 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (recognizing that consideration of race
in admissions is permissible, provided that certain conditions are met); Parents Involved in
Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
343 (2003) (allowing a law school admission plan’s more limited use of race-based prefer-
ences); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (invalidating an undergraduate plan as
a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
351 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant Rights
and Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1634–35 (2014).
352 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326).
353 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 732 (“Racial balancing is not transformed from
‘patently unconstitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial
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A similar prohibition applies to gender-based policies, albeit with a different
constitutional test.354
Courts evaluating a jury system influenced by big data will thus have to
consider these equal protection concerns.  Three arguments respond to
these constitutional issues.  First, the Court could treat juries differently
because the Sixth Amendment mandates “a fair cross-section” requirement,
which implies a level of race and gender consciousness.  Second, a big data
jury system might be the rare race conscious policy to survive strict scrutiny
because of the compelling governmental interest in representative juries.
Third, and perhaps somewhat controversially, big data can avoid the use of
explicit race or gender-based criteria by offering proxy categories to select a
representative cross-section of the community.  In the same way that courts
currently use geography as a proxy to ensure a racial balance in some cities
(knowing that certain neighborhoods correlate with race), big data can offer
other non-racial proxies to gain similar diversity without explicitly relying on
race.  Each argument will be discussed in turn.
a. Juries Are Different
For several decades now, scholars have argued that juries differ from
other institutions with respect to racial and gender considerations.355  This
argument rests on both constitutional and historical grounds.
First, the Sixth Amendment mandates that the jury come “from a repre-
sentative cross-section of the community.”356  This constitutional mandate
implies a desire for relative diversity within the jury venire.  Early equal pro-
tection cases concerning juries extolled the importance of racial equality in
the jury process.357  Such diversity has long been understood to enhance the
legitimacy of the jury verdict,358 facilitate greater discussion in the jury
room,359 broaden political participation,360 and improve the democratic ele-
diversity.’”); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 651 (1993) (“[R]acial classifications receive close
scrutiny even when they may be said to burden or benefit the races equally.”).
354 See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–34 (1996); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971); see also Jason M. Skaggs,
Justifying Gender -Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persua-
sive Justification” Standard, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1172–73 (1998).
355 Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704, 729 (1995); Forde-
Mazrui, supra note 70, at 374–75; King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 13, at 766.
356 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975).
357 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879).
358 See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005) (“[T]he ‘harm from discrimina-
tory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror
to touch the entire community.  Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black per-
sons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice.’”
(quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986))).
359 Erin York Cornwell & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through Participation: A Mul-
tilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667, 668 (2011) (“High levels of
participation may be especially beneficial for jury fact-finding when jurors are drawn from
all segments of the community.”).
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ment of the law.361  Further, the negative consequences of racial prefer-
ences—harm and stigma—do not apply in jury selection in the same way as
they might in employment contexts or college admissions.362
History also supports the use of affirmatively mixed juries.  At the time of
the Founding, the English practice of using a jury de medietate linguae was well
known.363  This “jury composed half of Englishmen and half of the country-
men of an alien party”364 had been adopted by the colonists and used in
several disputes with Native Americans.365  Similarly, at the time of the
Reconstruction Amendments, when the drafters of the Equal Protection
Clause were at work, racially mixed juries had been designed to handle high
profile cases such as the treason trial of Jefferson Davis.366  After studying the
era, Professor Albert Alschuler concluded, “Statesmen of the generation that
wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment apparently did not consider
racially balanced juries discriminatory.”367
360 Alschuler, supra note 355, at 729 (“The case for employing color-conscious mea-
sures to promote the expression of diverse perspectives in the jury room seems at least as
compelling as the case for employing color-conscious measures in the allocation of broad-
cast licenses.”); id. (comparing juries to other race-conscious decisions such as that in
Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)).
361 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (“Jury service preserves the democratic
element of the law, as it guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance
of the laws by all of the people.”).
362 Alschuler, supra note 355, at 718 (“Juries are distinctive both because affirmative
action in jury selection has special virtues and because it is likely to prove less costly to
individuals and society than affirmative action in other contexts.”).
363 See, e.g., Deborah A. Ramirez, A Brief Historical Overview of the Use of the Mixed Jury, 31
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1213, 1214 (1994).
364 Alschuler, supra note 355, at 713–14 (“Before the end of the twelfth century,
English charters promised Jews that disputes between Jews and English subjects would be
resolved by juries composed half of Jews and half of Englishmen.  These charters
originated the English jury de medietate linguae—a jury composed half of Englishmen and
half of the countrymen of an alien party.  The use of mixed juries in cases involving aliens
remained a feature of English law for 700 years.” (footnotes omitted)).
365 Deborah A. Ramirez, The Mixed Jury and the Ancient Custom of Trial by Jury De Medie-
tate Linguae: A History and a Proposal for Change, 74 B.U. L. REV. 777, 790 (1994) (“Records
of the Plymouth Colony indicate that its courts used mixed juries composed of Native
Americans and colonists as early as 1674.”).
366 Alschuler, supra note 355, at 714–15 (“When Reconstruction governments ended
the exclusion of African-Americans in the South, they sometimes mandated racial quotas
as well.  The first African-Americans selected for jury service in the South were the six
impaneled along with six whites to try Jefferson Davis for treason.  Although this racially
balanced jury was discharged when the government elected not to prosecute, in at least a
few southern jurisdictions, judges and other officials ensured that the earliest integrated
juries were composed half of blacks and half of whites.” (footnote omitted)).
367 Id. at 715 (citing Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754 (1985) (“[R]ace conscious Reconstruction
programs were enacted concurrently with the fourteenth amendment and were supported
by the same legislators who favored the constitutional guarantee of equal protection.  This
history strongly suggests that the framers of the amendment could not have intended it
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In truth, however, neither constitutional law nor history controls the
answer, and unquestionably there exists a tension between the fair cross-sec-
tion requirement and the Equal Protection Clause.368  This tension has con-
tributed to some experiments of affirmative juror selection, which arguably
implicate the Equal Protection Clause, but largely remained unchal-
lenged.369  This tension has also generated some creative scholarly sugges-
tions to improve diversity in jury selection.370  The tension, however, remains
unresolved.
Even if juries do not differ sufficiently so as to avoid a traditional equal
protection analysis, their unique role in the constitutional system and their
specific history may impact the application of the strict scrutiny test.371  As
will be discussed next, the special, constitutional role of juries may affect the
government’s compelling interest in designing a representative jury.
b. Surviving Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is a demanding test, requiring the government to prove
that the race-conscious policy was narrowly tailored and reasonably necessary
generally to prohibit affirmative action for blacks or other disadvantaged groups.”)); see
also ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION 67 (1992).
368 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 70, at 368 (“Race-conscious selection procedures designed
to create representative juries implicate two constitutional provisions: the Sixth Amend-
ment and the Equal Protection Clause.  Some of the cases decided under these provisions
provide support for affirmative selection procedures, while others provide a more ambigu-
ous, even contradictory, message about the permissibility of representativeness-by-
design.”); King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 13, at 766 (“Read as a whole, the jury
decisions from the past two decades demonstrate that the Court is acutely aware of the
inherent conflict between the two values or norms that dominate these cases: the impor-
tance of recognizing that racial composition affects fairness, or at least its appearance, and
the imperative to avoid treating potential jurors differently because of their race or endors-
ing the legitimacy of racial discrimination.”).
369 Alschuler, supra note 355, at 711 (“In Arizona, a bar committee has proposed divid-
ing jury lists into subsets by race and drawing jurors from each subset.  Some Arizona
judges currently strike trial juries that, in their view, do not include adequate numbers of
minority jurors.  In DeKalb County, Georgia, jury commissioners divide jury lists into thirty-
six demographic groups (for example, black females aged 35 to 44); they then use a com-
puter to ensure the proportional representation of every group on every venire.” (foot-
notes omitted)); King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 13, at 722 (“Some courts take an
active role in ensuring that qualified lists or venires reflect the racial composition of the
adult population.”).
370 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 70, at 358; John J. Francis, Peremptory Challenges, Grutter,
and Critical Mass: A Means of Reclaiming the Promise of Batson, 29 VT. L. REV. 297, 298 (2005).
371 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 70, at 358 (“Recent Supreme Court cases interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause in the contexts of jury selection and affirmative action programs
suggest that most race-conscious jury selection procedures would be subjected to the most
rigorous scrutiny.  These cases seem to indicate that the Court would hold most race-con-
scious jury selection procedures unconstitutional.” (footnote omitted)).
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to advance a compelling governmental interest.372  While not always “fatal in
fact,”373 strict scrutiny remains a difficult hurdle to overcome.374
Creating a big data-infused jury system which explicitly takes into
account race, gender, and other factors in an attempt to create a fair cross-
section of the community, however, could be considered a sufficiently com-
pelling governmental interest.  As stated, not only does the Sixth Amend-
ment mandate this ideal, the Supreme Court has stated this principle of
inclusion as a goal in a series of court opinions.375  Further, at least in some
jurisdictions, because of the long history of jury inequality, one could argue
that the justification for the change was to remedy the effects of past inten-
tional racial discrimination by the discriminating entity: the court.376  In
addition, courts could borrow from the reasoning used in some educational
diversity cases to make the argument that diverse juries help develop “cross-
racial understanding” and “break down racial stereotypes.”377  Or as Profes-
sor Nancy King argued,
[E]ven if strict scrutiny is the appropriate method for evaluating these poli-
cies, courts that apply such scrutiny should recognize (1) that maximizing
the appearance of fairness of criminal jury proceedings is a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, (2) that fair racial representation on juries is vital to the
appearance of fairness in criminal jury proceedings, and (3) that in some
circumstances race-conscious selection practices may improve, not impair,
this appearance.378
All of these aspects of jury selection support the argument that improv-
ing jury selection—even with some explicit consideration of race or gender
in the big data algorithm—represents a governmental interest so compelling
that it survives strict scrutiny.
Whether such a big data jury selection process (which includes race as a
factor) is narrowly tailored to further this interest presents a more difficult
372 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993).
373 Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972). But
see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1701
(1985) (“Race conscious remedies do not always violate equal protection; the Court has
upheld such remedies in the busing cases and the redistricting cases.” (citing Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430
U.S. 144, 165 (1977))).
374 See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 870 (2006).
375 See supra Part I.
376 Certainly in some jurisdictions, the long history of racial discrimination in jury selec-
tion should inform the analysis. See JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND
THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 99–100 (Harvard Univ. Press 2001) (1994) (describing the his-
tory of racial discrimination in American juries).
377 Francis, supra note 370, at 298 (“Grutter specifically recognized a compelling state
interest in obtaining a ‘critical mass’ of diversity in an academic environment to develop
‘cross-racial understanding’ and ‘break down racial stereotypes.’” (quoting Grutter v. Bol-
linger, 509 U.S. 306, 330 (2003))); Re, supra note 28, at 1575.
378 King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 13, at 762 (footnote omitted).
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question.  Here the Supreme Court has generally looked to see whether less
restrictive, race-neutral alternatives exist.379  Of course, such alternatives do
exist even if none have actually solved the problem of unrepresentative
juries.380  The current system was purposely designed to avoid equal protec-
tion problems and, while obviously imperfect, represents a race-neutral alter-
native.  Thus, in order survive the narrowly tailored prong, any racial aspect
must be extremely limited or, as will be discussed in the next subsection,
masked so as to not rely upon race per se.  While some scholars have argued
that a carefully crafted racially conscious jury selection system would survive
strict scrutiny,381 most have instead proposed workaround solutions that
achieve the same end without a direct conflict with the Equal Protection
Clause.  Bright data also offers this possibility.
c. Proxy Solutions
For all of the concern about equal protection, current jury selection is
not completely race blind, even if not explicitly race-guided.  For example, in
a random selection system, courts do not send summons to one neighbor-
hood, and then sequentially to another, and then another.  Instead courts
scatter summons among different neighborhoods in an attempt to maximize
the chances of not only geographic diversity, but also racial and class-based
diversity.  Courts sometimes even target certain areas more than others in
order to obtain racial diversity through a racially neutral selection system.382
Big data offers the same advantages of utilizing proxy measures but with
even more sophisticated information.  Just as consumer marketing compa-
nies target categories of people with terms “such as ‘Urban Scramble’ or
‘Mobile Mixers,’ both of which include a high concentration of Latinos and
African Americans,” or non-urban consumers with names like “‘Rural
Everlasting,’ which includes single men and women over the age of 66 with
‘low educational attainment and low net worths,’”383 so too could jury selec-
tion systems.  Just as the use of big data information can circumvent Batson by
proxy, the use of big data information can side-step the equal protection
challenge by finding more sophisticated proxies to replace the forbidden cat-
egories of race or gender.
379 Id. at 752–53 (“[T]he Court will insist on the prior consideration of race-neutral
alternatives, and will be unlikely to accept a jurisdiction’s claim that there are no such
options available to accomplish its aims. . . . If a state’s goal is to prevent future intentional
discrimination in jury selection, the state could simply deprive jury selectors of the oppor-
tunity to discriminate by requiring mechanical or random selection, or by removing access
to information about the race of potential jurors.”).
380 See supra Part I.
381 See generally Forde-Mazrui, supra note 70; King, Racial Jurymandering, supra note 13.
382 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 70, at 367 (“[A]reas populated predominantly by mem- R
bers of minority groups could be sent additional jury summonses to increase the number
of minorities that appear for jury service.”).
383 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 17, at 47.
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Again, to be clear, the fact that this workaround method exists does not
mean a court considering the use of big data should feel comfortable with
this solution.  Trying to circumvent equal protection restrictions using proxy
categories to represent race (without explicitly using race) is problematic.
Yet, oddly, under current equal protection law, this approach might survive
constitutional scrutiny.
d. Evaluating the Equal Protection Concerns
Whether or not a big data jury selection system can survive an equal
protection challenge remains an open question.  Importantly, however, court
systems wary of inviting a challenge may hesitate even to take the risk.
Defendants would have every incentive to challenge the jury selection system
on equal protection grounds, and constitutional challenges would be expen-
sive and difficult to litigate.  As a general matter, this litigation reality pro-
vides a disincentive for many jury innovations as most new processes are
subject to challenge.
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to think through the challenges big data
poses to existing jury selection processes.  The current jury selection system,
while theoretically fair and impartial, produces suboptimal results in prac-
tice.  Big data offers a technologically feasible solution to create a truly repre-
sentative jury.  However, the solution also presents real risks to the jury as an
institution.  Courts considering adoption of new technologies will need to
weigh these factors carefully as any change to existing policies may have unin-
tended consequences.
Courts will soon be confronted with a hard choice about whether big
data could benefit their jury selection system.  At a minimum, the rise of big
data may cause courts to rethink the existing selection practices and evaluate
why certain information is collected and other information is ignored.  A
debate over different conceptions of jury diversity might recharge a discus-
sion about the role of the jury in America.
In addition, in terms of picking the actual jury, big data might cause a
lawyer to rethink his or her own implicit or explicit biases in jury selection.
The broad categories of race, gender, and employment have always been
unsophisticated and inexact predictors for any particular case.  Replacing
those categories with more and better information may encourage more
accurate, and less discriminatory, use of peremptory challenges.  More
nuanced information may provide reasons for keeping a particular juror that
a party would otherwise have struck on impermissible grounds.
Finally, embracing big data may also spur new innovations in how courts
and litigants conduct voir dire.  Most jury selection processes still involve
rather rudimentary technology, usually incorporating a pencil, note cards,
raised hands, or conversation.  Bright data information could be incorpo-
rated into electronic juror surveys located on electronic tablets and could
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make the entire jury selection process more efficient.  And, of course, courts
could choose to adopt a modified bright data system for venire creation and
not provide that personal data to litigants for the actual jury selection.  The
two innovations do not need to be adopted together.  However, as data
becomes more available, and as the costs of using the systems become more
affordable, the ease of using the information throughout the jury selection
process will increase.
These questions—large and small—will require answers in the near
future.  As big data systems grow in sophistication, the temptation for courts
to utilize this information will increase.  This Article raises and addresses the
biggest concerns as society prepares for the big data jury.
